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Abstract. This Article explores the role of insurance as a substitute for direct regulation 
of risks posed by severe weather. In pricing the risk of human activity along the predicted 
path of storms, insurance can provide incentives for efficient location decisions as well as 
for cost-justified mitigation efforts in building construction and infrastructure. Currently, 
however, much insurance for severe-weather risks is provided and heavily subsidized by 
the government. This Article demonstrates two primary distortions arising from the 
government’s dominance in these insurance markets. First, existing government subsidies 
are allocated differentially across households, resulting in a significant regressive 
redistribution favoring affluent homeowners in coastal communities. This Article 
provides some empirical measures of this effect. Second, existing government subsidies 
induce excessive development (and redevelopment) of storm-stricken and erosion-prone 
areas. While political efforts to scale back the insurance subsidies have so far failed, this 
Article contributes to a reevaluation of the social regulation of weather risk by exposing 
the unintended costs of government-subsidized insurance. 
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Introduction 
Catastrophes due to severe weather are perhaps the costliest accidents 
humanity faces.1 While we are still a long way from having technologies that 
would abate the destructive force of storms, there is much to be done to reduce 
their impact. True, government cannot regulate the weather. But through 
smart policies and well-designed incentives, it can influence human exposure 
to the risk of bad weather. Regulation may not be able to control high winds or 
storm surges, but it can encourage people to build sturdier homes with 
stronger roofs far from flood plains. We call weather-related catastrophes 
“natural disasters,” but the losses due to severe weather are the result of a 
combination of natural forces and often imprudent, shortsighted human 
decisions induced, as this Article will go on to show, by questionable 
government policies.2 
Regulating weather risk is an increasingly urgent social issue. There is 
little doubt that the frequency and magnitude of weather-related disasters are 
rising over time.3 Although the precise combination of causes—including 
emissions of greenhouse gases, natural climatic cycles, and the increased 
concentration of populations in coastal areas—may be debated,4 the trend is 
undisputed.5 Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 brought 
unprecedented property damage to the Gulf states and to the coastal 
 
 1. As of 2008, of the twenty most costly insured catastrophes in the world, eighteen were 
weather related. The other two were the 9/11 attacks and the Northridge Earthquake. 
HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE 
WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 5, 6 tbl.1.1 
(2009). 
 2. See, e.g., WORLD BANK & UNITED NATIONS, NATURAL HAZARDS, UNNATURAL DISASTERS: 
THE ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 23 (2010) (“[N]atural disasters, despite the 
adjective, are not ‘natural.’ Although no single person or action may be to blame, death 
and destruction result from human acts of omission—not tying down the rafters allows 
a hurricane to blow away the roof—and commission—building in flood-prone areas. 
Those acts could be prevented, often at little additional expense.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Adam B. Smith & Richard W. Katz, US Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate 
Disasters: Data Sources, Trends, Accuracy and Biases, 67 NAT. HAZARDS 387, 388-89 (2013) 
(evaluating data on insured losses published in Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate 
Disasters: Table of Events, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.ncdc 
.noaa.gov/billions/events (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)). The measure of total losses is an 
estimated $1.1 trillion for the period from 1980 to 2011. Id. at 388 fig.1. 
 4. For an argument that, although climate change is undeniably occurring and is affected 
by human influence (mainly through carbon emissions), the relationship between 
climate change and severe weather has been overstated, see the work of Roger  
Pielke Jr., summarized in Roger Pielke Jr., An Obama Advisor Is Attacking Me for 
Testifying that Climate Change Hasn’t Increased Extreme Weather, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116887/does-climate-change-cause-extreme 
-weather-i-said-no-and-was-attacked. For evidence that at least one cause of increased 
weather-disaster losses is increasing population density around the coasts, see sources 
cited in note 11 below. 
 5. See sources cited supra notes 3-4. 
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northeastern states, respectively;6 and in 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, which 
devastated the Philippines—eliminating entire villages and killing thousands—
may have been the strongest tropical cyclone to hit land in recorded history.7 
Beyond anecdotes, the trend is clear: weather-disaster losses are rising.8 And the 
most ominous harbinger of the trend is the expected rise in sea levels. Higher 
sea levels would lead to a massive increase in the storm surges that accompany 
severe hurricanes.9 What in the past would have qualified as “100-year storms” 
(one percent chance of occurrence annually) would become “10-year storms” 
(ten percent chance of occurrence annually).10 
Even as the magnitude and frequency of weather patterns seem to pose a 
higher risk than ever, a large and growing fraction of humanity’s physical 
assets is located in harm’s way.11 While it is clear that the costs of hurricanes 
have increased dramatically and are likely to increase even more in the future, 
much of the upward trend in storm-loss data can be explained not by weather 
fluctuations but by increased concentration of property in dangerous areas, 
namely by human decisions to locate more densely in the storms’ paths.12 Thus, 
the combination of severe natural forces and increased human exposure poses 
one of the major public policy challenges of our era: how to regulate behavior 
so as to reduce this risk. 
There are many ways that societies can reduce the risk of increasingly 
large and potentially devastating storms. Our thesis in this Article is simple: the 
most effective way to prepare for storms is through insurance. But not in the 
 
 6. See Smith & Katz, supra note 3, at 388 fig.1 (illustrating that the frequency and loss total 
from severe storms increased over the last several years); Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters: Summary Stats, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www 
.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 7. Typhoon Haiyan1: Worse than Hell, ECONOMIST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.economist 
.com/news/asia/21589916-one-strongest-storms-ever-recorded-has-devastated-parts 
-philippines-and-relief. 
 8. See, e.g., Smith & Katz, supra note 3, at 388-89; Peter Hoeppe, Why Are Cities 
Particularly Affected by Climate Change?, PowerPoint Presentation at Geneva Ass’n 
Sixth Extreme Events & Climate Risk Seminar (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www 
.genevaassociation.org/media/907365/ga_6th_eecr_seminar_hoeppe.pdf. 
 9. See Claudia Tebaldi et al., Modelling Sea Level Rise Impacts on Storm Surges Along US 
Coasts, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr.-June 2012, at *10, http://iopscience.iop.org/article 
/10.1088/1748-9326/7/1/014032/pdf. 
 10. Id. at *7. 
 11. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION REPORT: 
POPULATION TRENDS FROM 1970 TO 2020, at 3, 5 (2013) (showing the higher rate of 
population density growth in coastal regions than in the nation overall); Brenden 
Jongman et al., Global Exposure to River and Coastal Flooding: Long Term Trends and 
Changes, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 823, 826, 829 tbl.1 (2012) (showing relative changes 
in population exposed to coastal flooding over changes in total population from 1970 
to 2010). 
 12. Stanley A. Changnon et al., Human Factors Explain the Increased Losses from Weather and 
Climate Extremes, 81 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 437, 441 (2000). 
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obvious manner, where insurance operates as a form of postdisaster relief. 
Rather, we argue that insurance contracts should operate as a form of private 
regulation of safety, incentivizing precautionary behavior prior to the occurrence 
of losses. We argue that a well-functioning private market for insurance can 
accomplish two fundamental objectives that are currently ill served. First, 
private insurance can induce optimal—which is to say, more prudent—
investments during the development of communities. Second, private 
insurance can impose the cost of severe weather on homeowners who live in 
destruction-prone areas, eliminating an array of subsidies and discounts that 
they currently enjoy. We demonstrate that these existing subsidies most help 
those who need them least: namely, affluent homeowners living near the 
waterfront. 
The idea that insurance can create efficient incentives for risk mitigation 
might surprise some of our readers. Like many, they have been schooled in the 
paradigm that insurance creates moral hazard.13 Insurance may be good as a 
form of postdisaster relief and risk shifting, but the downside, we were taught, 
is that it dulls the insured party’s incentive to mitigate losses. We think, 
however, that the application of the moral hazard theory to insurance has been 
overstated. We have written an article dedicated to debunking the myth that 
insurance necessarily creates moral hazard.14 Insurers use a variety of 
contractual tools to prompt policyholders to reduce risks. While it is true that 
in some settings the presence of insurance coverage can reduce the motivation 
of policyholders to reduce risk, the opposite can also be true: through powerful 
incentives provided in the insurance contract, people who purchase insurance 
often do not fall prey to the moral hazard distortion, and may even take more 
efficient precautions relative to the uninsured.15 
The main way in which insurance induces efficient precaution is through 
graduated or differentiated premiums. If the price of insurance coverage is 
adjusted according to the riskiness of each individual policyholder, it operates 
like a private Pigouvian tax, internalizing the costs that might otherwise have 
 
 13. Much has been written about the moral hazard problem of insurance and ways to 
mitigate it. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 
(1971); Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). For 
the relevance of insurance-caused moral hazard to law, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, 
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14-15 (1986); and 
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 274 (1996). 
 14. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation1: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012) (examining how insurance contracts create 
incentives for safety precautions). 
 15. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It1: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 
5 REV. L. & ECON. 541, 543 (2009) (noting that insurance providers provide risk 
management services that can be value enhancing); Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing 
and Risk-Reducing Effort1: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental 
Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326-27 (2011) (finding that risk-based pricing 
incorporated in private insurance contracts can reduce the moral hazard problem). 
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been externalized by the activity.16 Moreover, in contexts in which insurers 
have better information about risks than their insureds (and they often do 
because they utilize far more sophisticated data collection and analysis 
methods), such premium differentials help not only to internalize cost but also 
to inform insureds of risks that they otherwise might not be aware of or fully 
appreciate.17 And insurers have a strong incentive to use such premium 
differentials because of the power of competition: if one insurer fails to 
discount its coverage accurately, some other insurer may step in and steal its 
customers.18 
The accuracy of risk-adjusted, cost-internalizing insurance premiums in 
the weather context, as in any other insurance market, affects both the care 
level and the activity level of policyholders.19 Such premiums encourage 
efficient construction methods because sturdier homes are cheaper to insure. 
And they influence the original locational decisions by signaling to potential 
buyers the true cost of living in the path of storms. As a result, an entire 
community’s preparedness for severe weather is importantly shaped and 
potentially improved by the aggregation of insurance contracts held by the 
community’s members. 
Unfortunately, in the United States, insurance is denied its potential role as 
an efficient regulator of prestorm conduct. It does not induce rational 
precautions by individuals, cost-justified community development by 
localities, or efficient infrastructure investment. American insurance fails to 
achieve these straightforward and enormously important roles for a reason 
that can be stated in one sentence: Insurance policies for extreme weather-related 
losses—especially for floods and for coastal wind damage associated with hurricanes—
are not priced to reflect the real risk.20 Rather, insurance policies for such risks are 
 
 16. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 207. A Pigouvian tax is a tax paid by actors 
whose conduct creates a negative externality, and if set at the level of the external cost, 
would correct inefficient behavior by private parties. See, e.g., Agno Sandmo, Pigouvian 
Taxes, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY ECON. (2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics 
.com/article?id=pde2008_P000351. 
 17. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 205-08 (describing practice by insurers of 
differentiated premiums). 
 18. Id. at 204. 
 19. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5 (2007) (“Injurers 
and victims will each have (at least potentially) two kinds of decisions to make: a 
decision whether, or how much, to engage in a particular activity; and a decision over 
the degree of care to exercise when engaging in an activity.”); Ben-Shahar & Logue, 
supra note 14, at 208 & n.26 (explaining that, in the context of auto insurance, the miles 
driven represent the activity level while speed and safety represent the level of care). 
 20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4008, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 6 (2009) (describing how the National 
Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) explicit subsidies and implicit cross-subsidies “lower 
the cost of living in high-risk properties” and “undermine the incentives for 
policyholders to carry out mitigation measures”). 
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sold or subsidized by the government in a way that produces what are often 
called “cross-subsidies.” This means that some parties pay more than their 
actual risk so that other parties (those who face the greatest and costliest risks) 
can pay less than their actual risk. 
Thus, as a result of government intervention in property insurance 
markets, through either rate regulation or direct government provision of 
subsidized insurance, private markets no longer generate price signals 
regarding the cost of living in severe-weather regions. The cost of insurance 
for relatively high-risk property owners is suppressed, thus failing to alert 
private parties who purchase property insurance to the true risk of living 
dangerously. Such cross-subsidies allow private parties to (rationally) assume 
excessive risk and dump the cost of living in the path of storms on others. 
Indeed, much of the development of storm-stricken coastal areas is due to 
insurance subsidies and would likely not have happened at the same magnitude 
otherwise.21 
Public debates over government-subsidized weather insurance often 
choose to ignore or downplay overdevelopment and excessive risk distortion 
because they regard government’s intervention in weather insurance markets 
as an important upside that trumps any efficiency distortion. Government 
intervention in property insurance markets is justified and even necessary 
because—so goes the argument—it makes insurance for severe weather 
 
 21. The Article here builds on the work of numerous researchers who have long studied 
the subject of catastrophic weather risks, some of whom have reached conclusions 
similar to the ones that we reach; Howard Kunreuther in particular is a pioneer in this 
field. See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 171, 184 (1996) (noting that private insurers can take steps to create 
disaster mitigation incentives); see also, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra  
note 1, at 8-9; J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for 
Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 358 (2006) (observing that the NFIP 
is not priced actuarially accurately and that flood insurance should be actuarially 
priced); Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Perfect Storm1: Hurricanes, Insurance, and 
Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 83, 106-07 (2009) (concluding that Florida’s 
expansion of government underwriting of catastrophe risk has undermined private 
markets, and noting that the state role in constraining private insurers’ ability to raise 
rates in response to increased hurricane risks can be counterproductive); Sean B. Hecht, 
Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 
1585-1604 (2008) (arguing that insurance has historically provided, and often has the 
potential to provide, incentives for mitigation specifically in the weather context); 
Howard Kunreuther, Introduction to PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF 
INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTER IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2-6 (Howard 
Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1998) (providing an overview of the problems 
of government and private insurance for disasters). This Article addresses the ways in 
which private insurance can provide more efficient weather mitigation incentives as 
well as a fairer allocation of the burden of insuring extreme weather risks than do 
current government insurance programs. As detailed later in the Article, we present, in 
particular, new evidence regarding the inefficiency and distributive unfairness of both 
the NFIP and state-based programs, such as Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation. 
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affordable. Insurance subsidies are necessary to help support low-income and 
working class people who might otherwise be unable to afford insurance and 
would therefore not be able to buy or remain in their homes. Subsidizing 
weather insurance is “our moral duty to the poorest people and working 
people and lower middle income people,”22 preventing “working folks” who 
are “doing everything they can to put food on the table” from losing their 
homes.23 The subsidy, in other words, is thought to promote a redistribution 
that benefits economically weak populations. 
We have long suspected that this justification is false. Our suspicion rested 
on the puzzling differential treatment of hurricanes versus tornadoes. These 
two types of severe storms cause similar aggregate magnitudes of property 
destruction,24 but federal subsidies apply to flood losses caused by hurricanes, 
not to wind losses caused by tornadoes.25 This was puzzling because hurricane 
victims live closer to water than do tornado victims, and it is generally known 
that living close to water is a privilege of the affluent. By contrast, a 
disproportionate amount of the harm caused by tornadoes occurs in 
connection with manufactured or mobile homes, which tend to be owned by 
people of lesser means.26 This pattern of subsidies going only to some classes of 
victims of severe weather but not to all, seemed inconsistent with the 
affordability-of-insurance rationale or with any intuitive equitable 
justification. 
 
 22. 151 CONG. REC. 19,751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
 23. 160 CONG. REC. S581 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (statement of Sen. Heitkamp). 
 24. See LLOYD’S, TORNADOES: A RISING RISK? 4, 19 (2013), http://www.lloyds.com/~/media 
/Lloyds/Reports/Emerging%20Risk%20Reports/Tornadoes%20final%20report.pdf (“In 
the US, annual aggregate losses from severe thunderstorms including tornadoes have, 
on average, accounted for more than half of all catastrophe losses since 1990.” 
(capitalization altered)). Over a longer term, between 1980 and 2011, 43% of windstorm 
losses were attributable to severe thunderstorms and tornadoes, compared with 50% 
for hurricanes. Id. at 4, 25. 
 25. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.  
 26. See, e.g., KEVIN M. SIMMONS & DANIEL SUTTER, ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACTS OF 
TORNADOES 6 (2011) (identifying mobile homes as one of the four “major 
vulnerabilities” for tornadoes); Severe Weather 101: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Tornadoes, NAT’L SEVERE STORMS LAB., http://www.nssl.noaa.gov/education/svrwx101 
/tornadoes/faq (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (“Mobile homes are, in general, much easier 
for a tornado to damage and destroy than well-built houses and office buildings.”); see 
also Facts About Manufactured Housing, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., http://cfed.org 
/programs/innovations_manufactured_homes/about_manufactured_housing/facts 
_about_manufactured_housing (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (noting that, based on 2009 
census data, the median household income for those living in manufactured homes is 
roughly sixty percent of the national average). Moreover, Wyoming, Kentucky, 
Arkansas, South Dakota, and Louisiana—states in the notorious “Tornado Alley”—are 
each within the top fifteen states in terms of numbers of mobile homes. Jillian 
MacMath, Misconception1: Mobile Homes Are Hit by Tornadoes More Often, ACCUWEATHER 
(Apr. 15, 2012, 10:05 AM ET), http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/mobile 
-home-vs/61830. 
Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 
68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016) 
579 
To explore this suspicion, we looked at the data and report them here. We 
examined insurance data from the government-run insurance program in 
Florida, which subsidizes homeowners’ insurance in the state most vulnerable 
to severe-weather impact.27 We found a surprisingly strong positive 
correlation between subsidy and wealth.28 Our data show that wealthier 
households receive higher subsidies in the form of underpriced insurance. And 
the magnitudes of the wealth effects are unquestionably large. We also 
surveyed a host of data resources regarding the federal flood insurance 
program, and they support the same conclusion: the primary beneficiaries of 
that federal program are relatively well-off homeowners. 
Our study, and in particular our findings regarding the correlation 
between wealth and subsidy, are intended to shed light on recent legislative 
activity, which was initially heading in the right direction but unfortunately 
ended up making things worse. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and the 
enormous bill that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—the 
agency that administers the federal subsidies for flood insurance—had to foot, 
Congress enacted with bipartisan support the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2012.29 Congress intended to scale back the federal subsidies, and 
the Act had the potential to provide better incentives for human preparedness 
for floods, especially for decisions to locate homes near water.  
But Congress did not let this laudable new statute live long enough to do 
any good. Immediately after it was enacted, subsidy recipients, now scheduled 
to lose their discounts, protested, and Congress quickly reacted—again, with a 
rare showing of bipartisan consensus—enacting an almost full repeal of the 
2012 reform. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 
restored the federal subsidies and cross-subsidies for flood insurance.30 Our 
results show that the rhetorical premise invoked by supporters of this Act—
that hard-working low-income people need it to keep their homes—is 
misguided. The beneficiaries of weather insurance subsidies largely are not low-
income folks. This finding is consistent with some prior work on the 
distributional consequences of government-provided flood insurance at the 
national level.31 
 
 27. See generally About Us, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citizensfla.com/web 
/public/about-us (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 28. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 29. Pub. L. No. 112-141, tit. II, subtit. A, 126 Stat. 916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4001-130 (2014)). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3-4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4014(g), 4015). See generally Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood 
Insurance Reform in a Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361 (2014) (explaining the 
political context that resulted in the enactment of Biggert-Waters and the 2014 
retrenchment, as well as arguing in favor of reduced cross-subsidies in the NFIP). 
 31. J. Scott Holladay & Jason A. Schwartz, Flooding the Market1: The Distributional 
Consequences of the NFIP 4 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Inst. for Policy Integrity, Policy Brief 
footnote continued on next page 
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We begin our analysis in Part I with a brief conceptual discussion that 
explains how property insurance can operate as a regulator of weather risk, 
explaining what tools insurance contracts use to improve the severe-weather 
preparedness of their policyholders. Part II then reviews (again, briefly) the 
features of government-provided insurance for severe weather, focusing on 
two programs: the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and Florida’s 
state-owned Citizens Insurance. Part III is the heart of our Article (and readers 
are more than welcome to skip Parts I and II and head directly to where our 
incremental contribution lies). It presents and defends our two normative 
claims: government insurance (i) creates unfair pooling of risk, favoring 
affluent policyholders, and (ii) leads to inefficient preparedness, locating far too 
many assets in the predictable path of storms. Part IV addresses some of the 
concerns about market failures and government failures that can inhibit 
private insurance as a form of weather-risk regulation.  
I. Regulation of Weather Risk by Insurance 
Weather risks can be reduced by direct command-and-control 
government regulation, mandating standards of predisaster conduct. Common 
examples include the adoption of building codes that require structures to be 
resistant to severe storms and other harsh conditions, or zoning restrictions 
that stop people from moving into the predicted path of storms.32 Private 
insurance contracts are a different type of regulation. Lacking the authority to 
mandate conduct, insurance companies create contractual incentives for insureds 
to engage in precautionary behaviors that cost less than the risk they reduce. 
Whereas command is the ultimate regulatory lever of a government 
agency, insurers use price. The insurance company’s way of creating incentives 
to reduce risk is to award lower prices to policyholders who face lower 
expected harms. Providing a menu of differentiated premiums induces 
individuals and firms to behave in ways that qualify for the insurance 
discounts. Auto insurers, for example, provide premium discounts for those 
who drive safer cars, less often, and accident free. Life insurers charge lower 
premiums for not smoking or scuba diving. And property insurers discount 
homes that face lower risk of loss due to severe weather.33 
In some areas of insured activity, insurers may not have the proper 
information to provide accurate discounts in return for policyholders’ safety 
 
No. 7, 2010), http://policyintegrity.org/documents/FloodingtheMarket.pdf. But see 
Okmyung Bin et al., Redistributional Effects of the National Flood Insurance Program, 40 
PUB. FIN. REV. 360, 362 (2012) (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
 32. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at xvi (noting the need for “well-
enforced building codes, tax rebates, [and] zoning ordinances” to help encourage pre-
accident mitigation). 
 33. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 231. 
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investment (although monitoring technologies increasingly make such 
information available).34 But asymmetric information is generally not a 
problem in regards to weather insurance. On the contrary, property insurers, 
both private and public, typically have much of the risk-relevant information 
on weather hazards—information far superior to that which homeowners 
have.35 They have a better understanding of how severe weather affects 
different types of construction.36  
An insurance policy that is priced according to risk features can become a 
powerful regulator of behavior. Differentiated premiums make it more costly 
for people to forgo safety investments. Policyholders are free to decide whether 
or not to install storm windows or roof anchors; no insurance broker is going 
to tell them that they must. But in regions in which these installations are cost 
effective, the premium discounts would more than offset the cost. 
One attractive feature of this form of safety regulation is avoiding the 
crude tradeoff inherent in command-and-control mandates. There is no need 
for the regulator to make an up-or-down binary choice whether to permit or 
prohibit some action. Instead, insurers build into the prices of their contracts 
the expected risk reduction associated with each safety investment, and then 
policyholders are allowed to self-select. Zoning regulations, for example, may 
require homes to be built at particular elevations, or may mandate the use of 
stilts or pilings, to maximize the chances that the homes will survive a storm 
surge. Insurance regulation, by contrast, does not mandate, but instead 
provides a menu of options—premium discounts to homes that invest in 
different degrees of precautions. Some, but not all, policyholders may choose to 
make the investments. The sorting that results from this menu approach to 
 
 34. See Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 
J. RISK & INS. 39, 76-77 (2010); Georges Dionne et al., Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Contracting, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 231, 232 (Georges Dionne ed., 2d ed. 2013). 
 35. Both private insurance companies and the government, including the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, use sophisticated mathematical models to predict 
severe-weather patterns. See generally Cassandra R. Cole et al., A Comparison of 
Hurricane Loss Models, 33 J. INS. ISSUES 31 (2010) (assessing alternative models used by 
insurers and regulators); Updated AIR Hurricane Model for U.S. Features Storm Surge 
Module, INS. J. (1June 29, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015 
/06/29/373284.htm (assessing recent changes in hurricane models). 
 36. The property insurance industry invests in research in this area through their 
collectively owned and run Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. See About 
IBHS, INS. INST. FOR BUS. & HOME SAFETY, https://www.disastersafety.org/research 
-center (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). In addition, the property insurance industry 
(especially the reinsurers) and insurance regulators have increasingly come to rely on 
sophisticated modeling techniques to predict the frequency, magnitude, number, and 
location of hurricanes. See, e.g., Charles S. White & Paul E. Budde, Perfecting the Storm1: 
The Evolution of Hurricane Models, CONTINGENCIES, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 25. These models 
are updated regularly. See, e.g., Updated AIR Hurricane Model for U.S. Features Storm Surge 
Module, supra note 35. 
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regulation avoids the over- or underinclusiveness of government-mandated, 
across-the-board safety requirements.  
Differentiated risk-based premiums affect not only the investment in 
precautions, but also the level of the insured’s activity. In the context of 
weather insurance, this activity-calibrating effect is enormously important. A 
crucial element of humanity’s preparedness for severe weather is the 
determination where to live, and in particular, where not to live. If the cost of 
exposure to severe weather is fully captured by the insurance rate, and thus 
fully borne by homeowners, they would make optimal location decisions 
(prompted by their mortgage lenders who require them to purchase full 
insurance). The leisure value of oceanfront living would be traded off against 
the full cost of such living, which should include the full insurance cost, and 
would thus affect—at the margin—moving decisions. 
The main tool for insurance regulation of severe-weather preparedness is 
the homeowners’ insurance policy, which—with the exception of flood 
damage—covers most storm-caused losses (primarily wind damage). The main 
factor that determines the premium differentials across policies is location: 
areas with the most storm activity face the highest premiums.37 Location 
pricing depends on historical data as well as prediction models, demographic 
trends, and construction practices.38 Premiums may be reduced dramatically 
according to particular construction specifications.39 For example, hurricane 
loss models used by insurance companies estimate that a home with a hip 
(pyramid-shaped) roof tends to sustain four percent less damage than a home 
with a roof with gable ends (triangular walls supporting slopes of a pitched 
roof, which could be peeled off under wind pressure).40 In fact, flood insurance 
 
 37. See, e.g., Homeowners Insurance, TEX. DEP’T INS. (Feb. 2015), http://www.tdi.texas 
.gov/pubs/consumer/cb025.html (noting that premiums will likely be higher in areas 
with higher storm activity); see also Gina Roberts-Grey, How Are Home Insurance  
Rates Determined?, INVESTOPEDIA (1July 23, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles 
/personal-finance/072314/how-are-home-insurance-rates-determined.asp (noting that 
weather-related claims drive up rates and cause the most claims). 
 38. See Cole et al., supra note 35, at 37-38; Cas. Actuarial Soc’y, Demographic Shifts Impacting 
Underwriting, Pricing, INS. J. (1June 2, 2009), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news 
/national/2009/06/02/101024.htm; Aarti Dinesh, How Catastrophe Experts Model 
Hurricane-Induced Storm Surge, INS. J. (1July 1, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com 
/magazines/features/2013/07/01/296787.htm. 
 39. For example, at least four states permit property insurers to discount premiums if the 
insured property is certified according to standards created by the insurance industry’s 
research center, the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS). Ins.  
Inst. for Bus. & Home Safety, FORTIFIED HomeTM: Hurricane Financial Incentives 
(n.d.), http://www.disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/FORTIFIED-Home-Incentives 
_IBHS.pdf (listing Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina as states allowing 
or requiring incentive programs by insurers based on IBHS certification); see also 
Fortified, INS. INST. FOR BUS. & HOME SAFETY, https://disastersafety.org/fortified (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2016) (explaining the IBHS certification process).  
 40. Cole et al., supra note 35, at 37-38. 
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sold by private insurers depends on so many risk and mitigation factors that 
the rating sheet used by some brokers to determine premiums is thirty pages 
long.41  
The potential of regulation by insurance is, of course, limited by various 
transactions costs. Some information is not worth sorting, even for the 
insurance industry. Some safety investments are not incentivized because they 
have long-term or external social value not captured by the insured. With 
homeowners’ insurance, for example, most policies are sold not on new 
construction but on existing buildings, at a time when various structural safety 
investments can no longer be made in a cost-justified way and thus can no 
longer be regulated by the policies. But buyers of new homes would take into 
account the overall cost of purchasing the asset, including insurance costs (and 
future insurance costs affecting the resale value), thus internalizing the risk 
and its mitigation costs into the decision of the land developer. Nevertheless, 
and despite the relative information efficiency of insurance markets, 
regulation by insurance is limited by the information available at the time of 
new construction. 
In the context of weather risks, private insurance also enhances the 
regulatory benefits of municipal building codes. Since storm resistance depends 
to a large extent on municipal building codes, the private insurance industry 
rates the different localities’ homebuilding standards and how well they are 
enforced.42 These building-code-effectiveness ratings are used by individual 
insurers to vary their premiums across the rated districts.43 For example, the 
rating may vary with the type of foundation the jurisdiction mandates for 
building in the floodplain, how the jurisdiction addresses postdisaster 
reconstruction permits, the funding it allocates to building code enforcement, 
how it trains its inspectors, and the standards it uses to review designs of new 
construction.44 This puts pressure on state and local governments to tighten 
their building codes and their enforcement of those codes.  
 
 41. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-568, FLOOD INSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS OF 
CHANGING COVERAGE LIMITS AND EXPANDING COVERAGE 15 (2013), http://www.gao 
.gov/assets/660/655719.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., INS. INST. FOR BUS. & HOME SAFETY, RATING THE STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CODE AND ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS FOR LIFE SAFETY AND 
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN HURRICANE-PRONE REGIONS (2011), http://www.disastersafety 
.org/wp-content/uploads/ibhs-rating-the-states.pdf (listing and assessing residential 
building codes in the Atlantic and Gulf Coast states). 
 43. Id. at 4 (indicating that the “Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule,” which was 
developed by the insurance industry, is used for insurance underwriting purposes). 
 44. See Idaho Surveying & Rating Bureau, Inc., Building Code Effectiveness Grading 
Schedule Questionnaire (2006), http://www.isrb.com/pubs/BCEGS%20Questionnaire 
.pdf. 
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II. Government-Provided Weather Insurance 
The previous Part examined the tools that insurance markets use to 
regulate behavior before weather disasters strike, with the primary tool being 
insurers’ ability to rate risks—to charge relatively high premiums for 
properties located in high-risk areas or properties that lack state-of-the-art 
weather mitigation features. We now turn to examining how government-
provided weather insurance works and how it differs from private insurance.  
Why, you might wonder, is the government involved in weather 
insurance in the first place? Why not leave all weather-risk insurance to the 
private market? There are several rationales commonly offered to justify 
governments acting as insurers of weather risk.  
First, it is sometimes argued that truly catastrophic weather events are 
sufficiently rare that property owners systematically underestimate the risk.45 
According to this behavioral account, purchasers of weather insurance do not 
fully appreciate the risk of severe weather and the cost of potential damage, 
and are therefore unwilling to pay actuarially fair premiums that insurers 
require to provide coverage. 
Second, the problem may lie not with the demand for, but rather with the 
supply of, coverage for severe-weather risks. Weather calamities may be too 
large or correlated to be insured through private markets. Or they may be too 
difficult to predict and price in accordance with prevailing actuarial practices. 
This would be consistent with assertions from insurance industry analysts 
that, at least during periods of tight markets, there is often insufficient insuring 
capacity, even within reinsurance markets.46 
Third, government provision of weather insurance may be necessary for 
affordability (redistributive) reasons. Even if policyholders were seeking to 
purchase and insurers were willing to provide actuarially priced weather-
disaster insurance, many policyholders simply could not afford such coverage, 
 
 45. See Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: 
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 154 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds.,                    
2006); Matthias Webber, Foreword to SWISS RE, FLOOD—AN UNDERESTIMATED RISK         
5, 5 (2012), http://www.biztositasiszemle.hu/files/201209/flood_&%238211%3B_an 
_underestimated_risk.pdf (“[I]t is more difficult to insure floods than many other 
hazards, not least because many people are not aware of their risk exposure.”); see also 
HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 113-15 (2013) (describing the 
demand anomaly of failure to protect against low-probability, high-consequence 
events). 
 46. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at 189-95 (discussing the questions of 
reinsurance capacity and the supply of insurance). “Reinsurance” is coverage purchased 
by insurance companies to manage their portfolio of risks, in case their reserves 
become insufficient. While certain catastrophe risks, such as hurricane risks, might be 
uninsurable by relatively small insurance companies, especially those who write a 
large number of policies in the affected region, they are made insurable through 
reinsurance markets, which aggregate such risks into larger, international pools.  
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especially in areas where disaster risk is large and thus costly to insure.47 Some 
fraction of these people could not have anticipated the high insurance costs, 
especially if weather-risk patterns have changed and grown over time. 
These rationales purport to provide the basis for government-provided 
weather insurance. For example, according to the Government Accountability 
Office, the original 1968 legislation that enacted the flood insurance subsidies 
was meant, among other things, “to provide flood insurance in flood-prone 
areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it.”48 And 
the original statute itself suggested a rationale to make “flood insurance 
coverage available on reasonable terms and conditions to persons who have 
need for such protection.”49 
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss two public programs that 
implement such subsidies, the NFIP and the Florida Citizens’ Property 
Insurance Corporation. In these programs, the government acts like an 
insurance company by issuing (or subsidizing the issuance of1) actual insurance 
contracts, charging premiums, and paying coverage to its premium-paying 
clients. To be sure, the government also insures weather risk by offering 
postdisaster relief through the Disaster Relief Fund, providing benefits to 
victims who suffer qualifying losses, paid for not through premiums but 
through taxes.50 The relief includes relatively small grants (up to $25,000) or 
 
 47. See Richard A. Derrig et al., Catastrophe Management in a Changing World: The Case of 
Hurricanes, 11 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 269, 272 (2008). 
 48. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 41, at 7. 
 49. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIII, § 1302, 82 Stat. 572, 
573 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2014)). 
 50. Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-relief-fund (last updated Oct. 9, 2015); Public Assistance: 
Local, State, Tribal, and Non-Profit, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit (last updated 
June 4, 2015). The federal government covers only 75% of disaster-related expenses, 
while states have to contribute the remaining 25%. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(g). The Disaster 
Relief Fund was created by the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-707, tit. I, sec. 106(a)(3), § 403(c)(3), 102 Stat. 4689, 4698 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C § 5170b(c)(3)). According to the Stafford Act, each state, through 
its governor, must request assistance from the President. Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 301, 88 Stat. 143, 146 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5170). As part of this request, the state must assert 
that it has an emergency plan that has been implemented but that the state’s plan is not 
sufficient to meet the need resulting from the disaster. Federal disaster declarations 
occur with some frequency. Between 2004 and 2011, the President received state 
requests for 629 disaster declarations, of which 539 (or eighty-six percent) were 
approved. See US. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-838, FEDERAL DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE: IMPROVED CRITERIA NEEDED TO ASSESS A JURISDICTION’S CAPABILITY TO 
RESPOND AND RECOVER ON ITS OWN 14 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650 
/648162.pdf.  
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loans.51 The government also provides some disaster relief by subsidizing 
private disaster-aimed charity through the charitable contributions deduction. 
But although charitable disaster relief can grow very large, it is dwarfed by 
government relief and by subsidized government insurance,52 to which we 
now turn.  
A. The National Flood Insurance Program 
Prior to the adoption of federally provided flood policies, what little 
insurance existed for flood-risk coverage was provided through private 
insurance contracts sold by commercial insurance companies.53 But they were 
not part of the basic homeowners’ insurance policy; instead, they had to be 
purchased as an added coverage, priced separately. Because, as we explained 
above, many property owners opted not to purchase the flood coverage, the 
federal government disaster relief fund was called upon for flood relief when 
big floods eventually hit. The NFIP was created in 1968 to provide relief from 
flood losses in a way that minimized the financial burden on federal 
taxpayers.54  
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(h) (setting maximum disaster relief award at $25,000 per disaster, 
adjusted annually for inflation). In addition to repairs and reconstruction, FEMA will 
cover temporary housing, as well as disaster-related medical, clothing, fuel, moving 
and storage, and even burial expenses. See Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA,  
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/disaster-process-disaster 
-aid-programs (last updated Oct. 3, 2015, 3:59 PM). 
 52. For example, the hurricane season of 2005 was the most expensive natural disaster 
stretch in U.S. history and led to charitable relief of roughly $2.5 billion. See To Review 
the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 21 (2006) (statement of Cynthia M. 
Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office). By comparison, the federal disaster relief for the 
2005 hurricane season exceeded $100 billion. Matt Fellowes & Amy Liu, Brookings 
Inst., Federal Allocations in Response to Katrina, Rita and Wilma: An Update (2006), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/8/metropolitanpolicy
%20fellowes/20060712_katrinafactsheet.pdf. By further comparison, private insurance 
coverage for Katrina totaled $41.1 billion. Robert P. Hartwig & Claire Wilkinson, Ins. 
Info. Inst., Hurricane Katrina: The Five Year Anniversary 2 (2010), http://www.iii.org 
/sites/default/files/1007Katrina5Anniversary.pdf. 
 53. See Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood 
Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 & n.7 (2006).  
 54. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIII, 82 Stat. 572 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129), created the NFIP. The 1968 Act followed 
a period of severe flooding, including damage caused by Hurricane Betsy and heavy 
flooding on the Mississippi River, all in 1965. Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood 
Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST 
NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 126 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. 
Roth, Sr. eds., 1998). In a 1966 report, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
proposed a system of government-provided flood insurance to replace general public 
assistance. It was in response to this report that Congress created the NFIP two years 
later. See id. at 127. 
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Through the NFIP, the federal government sells flood insurance policies to 
residential and commercial property owners. Although NFIP policies are 
marketed largely through private insurance companies, they are fully 
underwritten by the federal government.55 Coverage under NFIP flood policies 
is statutorily capped at $350,000 for homeowners and $1 million for 
commercial property owners.56  
NFIP policies are subsidized,57 which means that the premiums collected 
are not sufficient to cover flood claims, and the deficit is passed on to the 
Treasury Department. As a result, the U.S. taxpayer is currently the reinsurer 
of truly catastrophic flood risks. And because NFIP policies are cheaper than 
flood insurance sold in the private market, they have come to dominate the 
flood-risk market.58  
In addition to providing affordable flood coverage, the NFIP seeks to 
incentivize flood mitigation. To participate in the program and to entitle their 
residents to buy subsidized NFIP policies, communities are required to adopt 
and enforce a floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood risks to 
new construction. In these areas, new construction and substantial 
improvements must conform to the NFIP’s building standards. For example, 
the lowest floor of a structure must be elevated to, or elevated above, the “base 
flood elevation”—the level at which there is a one percent chance of flooding in 
a given year.59 
 
 55. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 41, at 4. There is a small private 
insurance market that provides coverage for home values in excess of the NFIP’s 
ceiling. Id. However, many carriers do not offer excess flood insurance policies, 
especially in the hardest hit areas. See, e.g., Britton Wells, Excess Flood Insurance—When 
the Federal Plan Isn’t Sufficient, INS. J. (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.insurancejournal.com 
/magazines/features/2006/08/07/72126.htm. 
 56. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 41, at 9. 
 57. National Flood Insurance Program Reform—Frequently Asked Questions, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/region-vi-arkansas-louisiana-new-mexico 
-oklahoma-texas/national-flood-insurance-program-reform (last updated Jan. 25, 2013, 
9:15 AM). 
 58. According to a RAND study published in 2006, 49% of all single-family homes in 
Special Flood Hazard Areas had NFIP policies and another 1% to 3% had private 
policies. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S 
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, at xvi (2006), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300
.sum.pdf. 
 59. See The National Flood Insurance Program1: Review and Reauthorization1: Hearing Before  
the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong.  
136 (2003) (statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, 
FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 6 (2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/283035.pdf.  
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While the rates charged by NFIP to its policyholders are based on flood 
maps that reflect the likelihood of floods in the different regions,60 the maps 
are often out of date.61 Even when the maps are updated, there are cross-
subsidies among insureds within the system, and a substantial percentage of 
property owners in high-risk areas are deliberately asked to pay well below 
actuarial rates.62 The maps are politicized: attempts by FEMA to update them 
and base the premiums on more actuarially sound calculus meet political 
influence.63 As a result, currently the NFIP is operating at a massive deficit, 
estimated in 2013 to be around $24 billion.64 
In response to this budget deficit and the concern that it might grow, 
lawmakers in 2012 enacted the so-called Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act.65 Biggert-Waters sought to gradually eliminate the underfunding 
of the NFIP and curb the disturbing cross-subsidies built into the program. For 
example, Biggert-Waters was going to phase out entirely the subsidies for 
certain “repetitive loss properties,” second homes, business properties, homes 
that have been substantially improved or damaged, and homes sold to new 
 
 60. National Flood Insurance Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema 
.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-flood-hazard-mapping (last updated Sept. 21, 
2015); see Understanding Flood Maps, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, https://www 
.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flooding_flood_risks/understanding_flood_maps 
.jsp (last updated Jan. 21, 2016). 
 61. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4008, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 14 (2009), http://www.cbo.gov 
/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10620/11-04-floodinsurance.pdf; see also 
Theodoric Meyer, Using Outdated Data, FEMA Is Wrongly Placing Homeowners in Flood 
Zones, PROPUBLICA (1July 18, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/using 
-outdated-data-fema-is-wrongly-placing-homeowners-in-flood-zones. Changes made 
by Biggert-Waters were supposed to improve the updating process. Scott Gabriel 
Knowles, Flood Zone Foolishness, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2014, 11:47 PM), http://www.slate 
.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/03/biggert_waters_and_nfip_flood 
_insurance_should_be_strengthened.html. 
 62. See RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42850, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 19-20 (2013) (stating that there 
is debate over whether rates truly reflect the risk and therefore charging the full 
amount would impair development in the highest-risk areas). 
 63. See Bill Dedman, FBI Investigates FEMA Flood Map Changes After NBC News Report, NBC 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2014, 5:50 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations 
/fbi-investigates-fema-flood-map-changes-after-nbc-news-report-n62906 (describing 
how many oceanfront properties mysteriously benefitted from FEMA’s redrawing of 
the flood maps, raising suspicion of political influence). 
 64. Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Act of 2012: One Year After Enactment1: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, 113th Cong. 48-49 (2014) (statement of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency). 
 65. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, tit. II, 
subtit. A, 126 Stat. 916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-130 (2014)). 
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owners.66 Biggert-Waters permitted much faster NFIP annual rate increases 
(25% annually, up from the previous 10% cap)67 and required all premiums to 
be based on average historical loss years, including catastrophic loss years.68 
This was aimed at improving the actuarial soundness of the expected-loss 
calculation. One of the most controversial aspects of the new law was the 
elimination of grandfathering for the many older buildings in high-risk 
areas.69  
However, the backlash from property owners along coastal areas, where 
resulting premium increases were the greatest, was swift and effective.70 In 
some areas, there were reports of homeowners’ premiums rising tenfold.71 The 
concern expressed by many lawmakers, on behalf of their angry constituents, 
was that unless Biggert-Waters was repealed or at least delayed, they wouldn’t 
be able to remain in their homes or continue their small businesses.72 Thus, 
before Biggert-Waters was able to take effect, Congress passed the Homeowner 
Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014,73 which significantly weakened the 
changes made by Biggert-Waters. The political pressure to repeal Biggert-
Waters was so successful that even Representative Maxine Waters voted in 
support of repealing her own bill.74 As a result, the 2014 Act imposed tighter 
limits on yearly premium increases, reinstated the NFIP grandfathering 
provision, and preserved the discounted premiums for properties even after 
being sold.75 The new law also called on FEMA to keep premiums at no more 
than one percent of the value of the coverage.76 
 
 66. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Biggert Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of  
2012: Impact of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Changes 1-2 (2013), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1909-25045-0554/bw12_sec_205 
_207_factsheet4_13_2013.pdf. 
 67. Id. at 1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Biggert Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2012: The NFIP’s Specific Rate Guidelines 3 (2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library 
-data/20130726-1920-25045-7258/fact_sheet_specific_rate_guidelines.pdf. 
 70. Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher Flood Insurance 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (1July 28, 2013), http://nyti.ms/16dM8FU.  
 71. Thomas Ferraro, U.S. Senate Passes Bill to Delay Hikes in Flood Insurance Rates, REUTERS 
(1Jan. 30, 2014, 4:36 PM EST), http://reut.rs/1dbzfMd. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-33 (2014)). 
 74. Rep. Waters, Author of Flood Reform Act, Calls for Delay in Implementation, INS. J. (Sept 30, 
2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/09/30/306602.htm. 
 75. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act: 
Overview 1-3 (2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396551935597 
-4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf.  
 76. § 7, 128 Stat. at 1023. 
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B. Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
The other example of large-scale government-sold insurance for weather 
risk is Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens)—a state-
owned company that specializes in wind-damage (and other, multiple-peril) 
coverage for homeowners and businesses in Florida. Wind damage, of course, is 
the largest element of weather risk covered by these policies, since flood 
damage, the other major weather peril, is already covered almost exclusively 
by the NFIP.77 Indeed, Citizens provides the vast majority of the wind 
insurance for properties on the coast of Florida, and in many high-risk coastal 
areas, Citizens is the only insurer in Florida offering wind policies.78 The 
company collects premiums that are used to pay the losses covered under the 
policies, but, as with the NFIP, the premiums are far below what is necessary to 
cover the full risk.79 
At first glance, Citizens appears to price its wind coverage in the same way 
private insurers do. Citizens begins by evaluating the risk of wind damage in 
particular areas, which consist of 150 geographic rating territories. Citizens 
then gives each territory a particular rate that takes into account weather 
patterns, construction methods, and past losses in that area.80 These wind rates 
are set with the use of sophisticated computer modeling techniques, informed 
by data about hurricane patterns, and adjusted periodically based on new 
information and updated experience. These base rates are then used by Citizens 
to determine the individualized premium charged for each individual policy.81 
This rating methodology is identical to the approach followed by private 
insurers, with one big difference. Citizens’ premiums collected from consumers 
do not reflect the actuarial risk associated with each insured property.82 Several 
 
 77. The details regarding the Florida property insurance market generally, the wind 
insurance market in particular, and how Citizens prices its policies, as well as the 
regulatory environment in which the company operates, derive from numerous 
discussions the Authors had over several years with Brian Donovan, Chief Actuary at 
Citizens. See Telephone Interviews with Brian Donovan, Chief Actuary, Citizens Prop. 
Ins. Co. [hereinafter Donovan Discussions]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Fla. Council of 100 & Fla. Chamber of Commerce, Into the Storm: Framing Florida’s 
Looming Property Insurance Crisis 1 (2010), http://www.flchamber.com/wp 
-content/uploads/IntotheStorm_FramingFLLoomingPropertyInsuranceCrisis 
_Januayr2010.pdf. 
 80. Telephone Interview with Daniel Sumner, Gen. Counsel & Chief Legal Officer, 
Citizens Prop. Ins. Co. (1July 19, 2013) [hereinafter Sumner Interview]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. In Citizens’ rate filings with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, the difference 
between the rate that would need to be charged to fully cover the risks insured by 
Citizens and the rate currently being charged is called the “indicated rate change.” 
Because of legislative and regulatory caps on the amount of annual premium increases, 
Citizens does not request actual rate increases equal to the indicated rate changes, at 
footnote continued on next page 
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reasons help to explain the gap between true risk premiums and charged 
premiums. First, state regulations place limits on the extent to which 
premiums can be increased, even when premiums are priced below actual risks. 
Second, there is some cross-subsidization among the 150 territories at the level 
of rate setting.83 Third, and most significantly, Citizens does not face the same 
budgetary constraints that private insurers do. If it falls short—if the premiums 
collected are not enough to pay for the wind damage it covers—Citizens can 
invoke an “assessment” process to cover the shortfall, which effectively shifts 
some of the catastrophic wind risk posed by hurricanes from Citizens’ 
policyholders to Florida taxpayers. 
Under the assessment process, Citizens can secure emergency funding for 
catastrophic losses that exceed its own reserves, as well as its various sources of 
reinsurance, by imposing a tax not only on all of Citizens’ policyholders but 
also on all insurance policyholders (including homeowners and car owners, 
among others) within the state. Part of this assessment/tax is collected up front, 
and part is spread out over a number of years until the deficit is paid.84 The net 
effect is that the premiums actually charged by Citizens to a policyholder for a 
given piece of property often do not reflect the full actuarial risk associated 
with that insured property. Moreover, as we show in detail below, the 
subsidies are not allocated equally among Citizens’ policyholders.  
This gap in funding has repeatedly been at the center of political 
controversy in Florida since the formation of Citizens in 2002. Following 2004, 
for example, when four major storms hit Florida (causing damages in excess of 
$25 billion), and 2005, the year of Katrina (causing damages in excess of $93 
billion),85 Citizens found itself deep in debt, owing nearly $5 billion, which 
then had to be recovered through insurance assessments.86 Legislation was 
then passed in 2007 expanding Citizens’ portion of the market by lowering the 
threshold for policy issuance, prompting some insurance industry 
representatives at the time to complain about the possibility of storm costs 
being externalized to taxpayers.87 Concerns about underfunding, caused by 
 
least not with respect to wind risk, where the gap between the actual rates and the 
indicated rates are the largest. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Assessments, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citizensfla.com/web/public 
/assessments (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 85. STUART HINSON, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. ET AL., 2005 ANNUAL 
SUMMARIES: FLOOD/FLASH FLOOD; LIGHTNING; TORNADO; HURRICANE 4-5 (William 
Angel ed., 2005), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/IPS/sd/sd.html (to locate, in the “Select 
Publication” field, select “2005-ANNUAL,” then follow temporary link to download).  
 86. See Fla. Council of 100 & Fla. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 79, at 2. 
 87. Steven Tuckey, Florida Lawmakers Expand Citizens Cover, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (May 14, 
2007), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2007/05/14/florida-lawmakers-expand 
-citizens-cover. The law was intended to make it easier for Citizens to compete with 
the private market by allowing consumers to purchase a Citizens policy if a policy 
footnote continued on next page 
Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 
68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016) 
592 
below-actuarially accurate premiums, have persisted, leading in 2012 to 
Governor Scott’s well-publicized (albeit misguided) claim that Citizens had 
roughly $500 billion in insured debt and only $6 billion in reserves.88  
III. The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 
Part I reviewed the tools available to insurers in regulating weather risk. It 
demonstrated that through differentiated premiums, private insurance has the 
capacity to perform a social function that is regulatory in nature: incentivizing 
better preparedness on the part of policyholders and better decisionmaking 
with respect to building location. Part II then explained that much of the 
insurance for severe-weather risk in the United States is provided by the 
government, through a variety of federal and state programs. 
How well does government insurance perform as a regulator of weather 
risk? In particular, how does it fare relative to the performance of private 
insurance? Would it be better to outsource the regulatory role of severe-
weather preparedness to private insurance markets? 
Given the underdeveloped private market for weather insurance, which is 
largely the result of the existence of government insurance,89 we cannot line 
up the two institutions nose-to-nose and compare. Instead, we identify 
elements that are unique to government-provided insurance and evaluate their 
effects. These effects can then be compared with hypothetical private insurance 
patterns, given what is known about private insurance operation in other 
markets.  
The analysis below examines the government’s insurance performance 
along two normative metrics: fairness and efficiency. Subpart A examines the 
distributive effects of government insurance and tries to answer a question 
often left unasked: Who are the beneficiaries of the implicit subsidies inherent 
in government insurance? Is it a progressive redistributive scheme? Subpart B 
 
from a private insurer cost more than 15% (as opposed to the previous 25%) higher than 
the Citizens policy. The industry countered that “[t]he more Citizens’ rates fail to 
reflect the risk at hand, the greater the financial crisis [that] will occur when a major 
storm hits.” Id. (attributing opinion to William Sander, a regional manager for 
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America). 
 88. See Toluse Olorunnipa, Rick Scott Said Citizens Has $500 Billion in Risk Exposure but Less 
than $10 Billion in Cash, POLITIFACT (1June 13, 2012, 11:03 AM), http://www.politifact 
.com/florida/statements/2012/jun/13/rick-scott/rick-scott-said-citizens-has-500-billion 
-risk-expo. This was an overstatement. To cause $500 billion in damages, every home 
and business insured by Citizens, in sixty-seven counties, would have to be destroyed. 
A more serious estimate of the deficit at the time would amount to around $1.5 billion, 
as a 100-year storm is projected to cause a maximum of $21 billion in damage and 
Citizens’ claims-paying ability, including its power to make assessments, was around 
$19.5 billion. See id. 
 89. See supra Part II. 
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examines the productive efficiency aspects of government insurance: How does 
it affect investment incentives? How does it affect total welfare? 
A. Distributive Effects 
“Now, is this a bailout for rich people?1” 
—Representative Bill Cassidy (R-LA)90 
1. Insurance cross-subsidies: who are the beneficiaries? 
Private insurance covers only premium-paying policyholders. That is how 
insurance markets work: risk-averse parties pay premiums to a privately 
managed fund that is contractually bound to cover certain specified losses if 
they occur. In a competitive environment, the premiums that insurers collect 
(minus administrative costs) must roughly equal the amount of the payouts. It 
follows that private insurance cannot pay claims of victims who have not paid 
into the insurance pool. It also cannot systematically undercharge some 
policyholders because that would require an offsetting systematic overcharge 
of others. Those who are overcharged can be cherry-picked by competitors 
who can offer them better terms. In private insurance, most of the 
redistribution occurs within the pool of policyholders and only ex post—
namely, from lucky nonvictims to unlucky victims. Although all real-world 
private insurance pools involve some cross-subsidization from the less risky to 
the more risky, in the ideal case, if premiums are set according to the risk data, 
there is no ex ante cross-subsidy—no policyholder pays for an expected benefit 
that others enjoy disproportionately. 
By contrast, because government insurance is partially funded by general 
tax revenues, there is no actuarial budget constraint. In fact, government relief 
programs and insurance plans are specifically intended to create systematic 
transfers favoring residents of disaster areas. And unlike private insurance, 
government-sold insurance can contain a systematic and intended discount to 
make its policies more affordable, and the deficit can be covered through the 
government’s general budget. Indeed, the unique feature of government 
insurance compared with private insurance, and the primary reason for 
establishing it, is precisely the creation of an ex ante cross-subsidy scheme.91 
 
 90. 160 CONG. REC. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2014) (statement of Rep. Cassidy) (“Now, is this a 
bailout for rich people? The people in Louisiana who will benefit from reforming our 
current process . . . are working people. . . . These are not rich people insuring vacation 
homes.”). 
 91. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 59, at 7 (“Congress mandated the use of 
subsidized premiums to encourage communities to join the program and mitigate 
concerns that charging rates that fully and accurately reflected flood risk would be a 
burden to some property owners.”). 
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Such cross-subsidies obviously conflict with actuarial conceptions of 
fairness—charging every person who is covered by an insurance policy a 
premium equal to that person’s expected benefits under the policy (“to each 
according to her benefit”). Actuarial fairness has an intuitive appeal, for 
example, when differences in risks are the result of individuals’ voluntary 
choices. It seems fair that smokers should pay higher life and health insurance 
premiums than nonsmokers, and that aggressive drivers pay higher auto 
insurance premiums. 
The cross-subsidy embodied in government insurance is an intended 
feature despite its violation of actuarial fairness because it is thought to be fair 
and progressive. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, 
Representative Barney Frank promoted increased funding to the NFIP because 
of “our moral duty to the poorest people and working people and lower middle 
income people.”92 More recently, when Congress reinstated the subsidized 
flood insurance rates in 2014 (after a previous bill sought to scale down  
the subsidies93), the bill was pitched as a program favoring struggling 
homeowners. It garnered bipartisan support (approved with a vote of 72-22 in 
the Senate) because cuts in subsidies “burdened lower- and middle class 
homeowners and small businesses.”94 As the House voted down an amendment 
to the bill that would have removed retroactive reimbursements of high 
premiums to the owners of coastal vacation homes,95 representatives invoked 
progressive sentiments by alluding to anecdotal stories of the suffering of 
lower-class, middle-class, and senior citizens as a result of the previously 
enacted premium hikes. The subsidies, one senator said, will prevent working 
families, who are “doing everything they can to put food on the table,” from 
losing their homes.96 As one of the bill’s champions explained: “This is not 
 
 92. 151 CONG. REC. 19,751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank); see also Rick Lazio, 
Letter to the Editor, Flood Fund Aids Working-Class Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
1993), http://nyti.ms/1UXyJcp (explaining how the legislation works to protect 
working class homeowners rather than the wealthiest members of society). 
 93. See supra Part II (discussing the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012). 
 94. 160 CONG. REC. E309 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2014) (statement of Rep. Castor) (“If this bill 
passes we will keep middle class families in their homes, bring relief to our local 
economy and provide needed reliability to middle class friends and neighbors.”); id. at 
H2102 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2014) (statement of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) (claiming that the 
astronomical premiums are pushing the family budgets of working class families to 
their breaking point); id. at H61 (statement of Rep. Scalise) (claiming that the increased 
premiums would fall disproportionately on hardworking “middle class families” who 
have never been flooded due to their own community-organized flood-safety 
measures) (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2014); id. at H56 (statement of Rep. Marino) (calling for a 
blanket repeal of Biggert-Waters). 
 95. Id. at H2141-42 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2014) (recorded vote of House approving bill with 
retroactive reimbursements intact); see also id. at S1627 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2014) 
(statement of Sen. Lee) (criticizing the lack of an amendment in the House-approved 
bill to remove retroactive reimbursements). 
 96. Id. at S581 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (statement of Sen. Heitkamp). 
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about millionaires in mansions on the beach. . . . These are middle class, 
working people living in normal, middle class houses doing their best to raise 
their kids, contribute to their communities and make a living.”97 
These insurance subsidy schemes are appealing because the risk differences 
are thought to be arbitrary, not the result of voluntary choice. People suffering 
high risk of weather disasters are hardly at fault, their losses are often 
devastating, and their insurance premiums are financially crushing.98 Thus, 
when polled, even people who are not affected by flood-insurance-premium 
subsidies (but who, perhaps unbeknownst to them, pay taxes to fund them) 
strongly support the subsidies. In one survey, only fifteen percent of unaffected 
Florida citizens supported premium increases.99 The affordability concern, 
bolstered by a strong intuition that the beneficiaries of the subsidies are lower-
middle-income families, trumps the amorphous conception of actuarial 
fairness as a way to achieve distributive justice.  
The cross-subsidy created by government-sold insurance follows, then, a 
distinct logic: it moves from people lucky enough to live in safe areas (the 
affluent) to the less lucky residents living in low-lying areas in storms’ paths 
(the poor). But this conjecture, that subsidized weather insurance benefits the 
less affluent, has not been fully tested.100 We believe that it is wrong and that 
the opposite is true: the subsidy accrues primarily to the affluent. This is for a 
simple reason: those who need flood insurance most are the habitants of 
properties built in proximity to the coast, where severe weather strikes most 
forcefully. Because properties adjacent to the coast are in general (putting 
 
 97. Id. at S1631 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2014) (statement of Sen. Landrieu). 
 98. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, DWELLING FIRE, HOMEOWNERS OWNER-OCCUPIED, AND 
HOMEOWNERS TENANT AND CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE UNIT OWNER’S INSURANCE: 
DATA FOR 2012, at 33-34, 53-54, 71-72 (2015), http://www.naic.org/documents/prod 
_serv_statistical_hmr_zu.pdf (showing that, in 2012, average “all-risks” homeowners’ 
insurance policies in the two states with the highest hurricane risks, Florida and 
Louisiana, cost between 169% and 397% of the national average (HO-3: $1034 national 
average, $1742 in Louisiana, $2084 in Florida; HO-5: $989 national average, $2688 in 
Louisiana, $3922 in Florida)). 
 99. Jeff Harrington, Poll1: Opposition to Flood Insurance Rate Hikes Is Strong, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Dec. 24, 2013, 11:10 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/poll 
-opposition-to-flood-insurance-rate-hikes-is-strong/2158508. 
 100. Relatively few studies of the distributional effects of government-provided weather 
insurance have been done. They focused on premiums collected and claim payments in 
connection with the NFIP and have come to differing conclusions regarding 
the regressive effects. One study concluded that “[t]axpayer-subsidized NFIP 
claims . . . represent a significant wealth transfer from middle-income counties to 
relatively wealthy and poor counties.” Holladay & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 5. 
Another study found “no evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantage[d] richer 
counties.” Bin et al., supra note 31, at 362. Both studies looked at county-level NFIP 
premium, payout, and income data, and thus were not able to pick up within-county 
effects: Are the rich within a county subsidizing the poor within a county, or the 
reverse? Our study includes individual-insurance-policy-level data, thus capturing 
redistributive effects with greater precision. See infra Part III.A.2.a. 
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weather risk to one side) more desirable and, on average, more expensive, the 
beneficiaries of the subsidies are not the poor but the affluent.101 
If in fact the high-risk beachfront owners are, all else equal, wealthier, they 
are less deserving of means-based government subsidies. Moreover, any form 
of government-subsidized insurance—disaster relief or contractual policies—is 
funded through general tax revenues, coming from middle-income taxpayers 
living mostly inland in lower-valued homes (or, as we saw, from assessments 
on drivers buying auto insurance).102 To the extent that high-income owners 
of beachfront property are the primary beneficiaries of this government 
insurance scheme, and to the extent that the cross-subsidy is 
disproportionately funded by the less affluent inland-residing taxpayers and 
policyholders, it represents a regressive form of redistribution. And, as a matter 
of public choice, the more the government has to bail out its undercapitalized 
insurance fund, the less tax revenue remains to spend on other, more 
progressive programs. 
A possible counterargument to our regressivity hypothesis is that high-
income property owners pay higher property taxes, which would offset the 
insurance cross-subsidy they receive. It is certainly true that coastal property 
owners in Florida pay higher taxes than inland property owners.103 That is 
where the most valuable properties lie. However, counties impose higher taxes 
on higher-valued properties for other reasons, not for funding the insurance 
subsidy. For example, higher property taxes pay for better schools and better 
public services for the residents of the wealthy counties. So although affluent 
counties are collecting more taxes from their residents, the counties use it 
mostly in-county, with little or no progressive redistribution.104 In addition, 
Florida’s overall tax policy, beyond property taxes, is among the most 
regressive in the country.105 Therefore, it is difficult to argue that overall tax 
 
 101. Holladay and Schwartz made a similar prediction: 
Beach front communities typically exhibit strong income gradients moving inland from the 
beach. The most expensive homes are those directly on the beach, followed by homes with a 
view of the ocean, then those within walking distance of the ocean, and finally those homes 
without easy access to the water. The value of property can often drop quickly with increased 
distance from the ocean. This income gradient is highly correlated and inversely related to the 
risk of flooding in those regions.  
  Holladay & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 5.  
 102. See supra Part II.B (discussing the structure of Citizens as a whole). 
 103. See Florida Property Taxes 2016, TAX-RATES.ORG, http://www.tax-rates.org/florida 
/property-tax (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (showing counties with the highest property 
tax payments are along the tip of Florida, where some of the largest insurance cross-
subsidies exist). 
 104. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, Property Tax Oversight (rev. Jan. 2014), http://dor 
.myflorida.com/dor/property/taxpayers/pdf/ptoinfographic.pdf (showing that state 
property taxes are assessed and distributed at the county level). 
 105. CARL DAVIS ET AL., INST. OF TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS?: A DISTRIBUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 4 (5th ed. 2015), http://www.itep.org 
footnote continued on next page 
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burdens in Florida counteract the regressive cross-subsidy built into premiums 
for publicly provided wind-risk insurance. 
To test the regressive redistribution hypothesis, we proceed in two ways. 
First, we examine the distribution of subsidies under Florida’s Citizens 
insurance. We begin with this scheme because the data about actual prices and 
subsidies is readily available, and this allows us to measure directly the 
direction of the redistribution. Second, we return to the NFIP and point to 
some indirect evidence regarding the direction of redistribution in that 
particular subsidy. Together, these observations suggest that government 
weather insurance has unappreciated, but substantial, regressive effects. 
2. Redistribution under Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation  
“[Florida] subsidized the well-to-do who live near the beach at the expense of 
the less-well-to-do who don’t.” 
—Michael Lewis, New York Times106 
a. Citizens’ data and some initial observations 
Citizens is the Florida state-owned insurance company that sells, among 
other types of coverage, wind-peril insurance policies to homeowners in every 
part of the state.107 While there are other state-run insurance programs, we 
study Florida’s Citizens because Florida is the state that faces the greatest 
hurricane risk, and therefore its insurance program is the largest and most 
important.108 As mentioned, the policies are priced according to the wind 
territory in which the insured property is located, of which there are roughly 
150.109 Prices are adjusted annually and have to be approved by the state Office 
of Insurance Regulation.110 Statutory and regulatory caps limit the extent to 
which Citizens can raise its rates in any given year.111 
 
/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf (showing Florida’s as the second most regressive state tax 
system in the country). 
 106. Michael Lewis, In Nature’s Casino, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 26, 2007), http://nyti.ms 
/23SsmNz. 
 107. Donovan Discussions, supra note 77. 
 108. Of the top ten cities at risk of hurricane damage, five are in Florida—the only state with 
more than one such city. Also, of the more than 6,500,000 homes along the Atlantic 
coastline and Gulf Coast region that are subject to severe hurricane risk, by far the state 
with the largest number (2,500,000) is Florida. Caitlin Bronson, Top 10 Cities at Risk for 
Hurricane Damage, INS. BUS. AM. (1July 7, 2015), http://www.ibamag.com/news/top-10 
-cities-at-risk-for-hurricane-damage-18950.aspx. 
 109. Sumner Interview, supra note 80. 
 110. See Donovan Discussions, supra note 77. 
 111. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(n)(6) (2015).  
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As discussed above, Citizens’ actual insurance premiums charged are 
known—and intended—to be different than the “true risk” premiums (those 
representing an actuarially accurate methodology).112 For every calendar year, 
Citizens publishes charts listing, for each individual policy, the actual premium 
and the true risk hypothetical premium, allowing a straightforward 
calculation of the subsidy each policy receives.113 In 2012, there were 527,250 
individual policies.114 This is the “policy-level data.” In addition, because 
policies are rated and priced based on the risk territory in which they are sold, 
and because all policies within a given territory enjoy the same proportional 
subsidy, some of the information can be analyzed by comparing patterns across 
territories. For that, we used aggregated “territory-level data.”115 
To get a general sense of the subsidy picture, we looked initially at the 
territory-level data. Here, in publicly available rate filings, Citizens publishes 
summaries for each of the 150 risk territories, showing the total sum of 
premiums paid by policyholders in that territory, as well as the “indicated” rate 
change—that is, how much more (or less) the company would have needed to 
charge policyholders in that territory to break even actuarially. Here is an 
example: 
 
 112. Donovan Discussions, supra note 77. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See infra note 115. 
 115. The data on which the following charts and statistics are based were supplied to the 
authors by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation in response to a public data 
request. The data were compiled by Citizens for the purpose of its September 30, 2012, 
rate filing with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (specifically, from Florida 
Office of Insurance Regulation filing number 13-13048), and they include a range of 
facts about every homeowners’ policy of a particular sort (HO3 policies covering wind 
risk) issued by Citizens in the relevant period. The information for each policy includes 
the premium actually charged for the policy, the “indicated premium” for the policy, 
the location of the insured property by zip code, and the amount of coverage, among 
other things. “HO3” refers to the most common standard-form homeowners’  
insurance policy. William C. Spaulding, Types of Homeowners’ Insurance Policies, 
THISMATTER.COM (2015), http://thismatter.com/money/insurance/types/types-of         
-homeowners-insurance.htm. For a sample HO3 policy, see Ins. Info. Inst., Homeowners 
3—Special Form (1999), http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/HO3_sample 
.pdf (providing an example of some of the typical provisions of an HO3 policy). We 
will refer to these data generally as “Citizens 2012 Wind Risk Data.” Copies of the data 
are available from the Authors and can also be secured separately from Citizens 
through a public data request. 
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Table 1116 
Territory Name Wind Premium Indicated Rate Change 
Monroe $38,582,378 126.5% 
Hillsborough (Excluding Tampa) $19,496,173 25.9% 
Pinellas-Saint Petersburg $29,059,878 14.7% 
Broward  
(Excluding Hollywood & Fort Lauderdale) 
$70,297,604 -12.5% 
Broward (Wind 47) $27,847,251 57.3% 
Broward (Wind 48) $21,530,419 17.3% 
 
In Monroe territory, for example, where some of the southern Florida 
Keys are located, the premiums actually collected by Citizens total $38,582,378, 
but they fall short of Citizens’ estimate of the expected risk. To be precise, an 
increase of 126.5% in the premium charged to each policy in that territory 
would be necessary to cover the shortfall. In Tampa’s suburbs and in Saint 
Petersburg, the shortfall in premiums is more modest, 25.9% and 14.7%, 
respectively. Many of the highly populated Florida areas—such as Broward 
County, where Fort Lauderdale is located—are divided into several risk 
territories. As Table 1 above shows, some of these territories, like the one 
labeled Wind 47, receive a substantial subsidy (57.3% above the actual cost); 
others, like Wind 48, receive a modest subsidy (17.3%); and some, like the one 
labeled “Broward” (but which contains only the more inland portions of the 
county) are actually overcharged—they do not receive any subsidy and in fact 
their premium helps cover the subsidy paid to neighboring properties. 
Since there are 150 territories and they vary greatly by the amount of 
subsidies they receive, we wanted to see if any pattern might be discerned. To 
that end, we created a map of Florida by risk territories and shaded each 
territory according to the magnitude of the subsidy it receives. The darker the 
shade of gray in which a territory is represented on the map, the higher the 
subsidy that territory receives. 
 
 116. Citizens 2012 Wind Risk Data, supra note 115. 
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* Map of Florida risk territories, based on Citizens 2012 Wind Risk Data. Shaded 
terrirotires depict subsidized wind-risk insurance premiums. Darker shades depict 
larger percent subsidies. 
 
Figure 1 shows a remarkable but predictable pattern. Coastal territories, 
almost without exception, enjoy large percentage subsidies, whereas inland 
territories receive smaller subsidies, if they receive any subsidy at all. A similar 
relationship can be seen when we zoom in and look at densely populated 
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* Map of south Florida risk territories, based on Citizens 2012 Wind Risk Data. Shaded 
territories depict subsidized wind-risk insurance premiums. Darker shades depict 
larger percent subsidy. 
 
The pattern is even clearer here: the subsidies are larger in territories very 
close to the water. Figures 1 and 2 also help us begin to speculate about a 
possible relation between subsidy and wealth, since water proximity is often a 
feature attracting wealthy home buyers.117 To visualize this, we plotted on the 
subsidy maps the location of the highest (represented on the maps by triangles) 
and lowest (represented on the maps by squares) wealth concentrations. The 
triangles mark territories in which the median home value is at least three 
standard deviations above the statewide median.118 The squares mark areas 
more than one standard deviation below median home value. No surprise: 
wealthy households are more often located in the high-subsidy (more deeply 
shaded on the maps) territories. Poor households are more often located in the 
low- or no-subsidy territories. 
These maps reflect the territory-based data, comparing the treatment of 
the 150 different insurance risk territories. Next we wanted to see if the 
distribution of the subsidies was indeed correlated with the distribution of 
 
 117. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, VALUE OF PROPERTIES IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM 9 fig.1, 10 fig.2 (2007) (showing that homes close to water are more 
expensive). 
 118. We used four different sizes to indicate 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, and 6+ standard deviations above 
the statewide median. 
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wealth. To do so, we needed more information about policyholders’ wealth. 
For this we used two metrics: 
(i) Home Value1: Home value is a good proxy for affluence because it is a 
significant component in people’s net wealth, accounting for roughly twenty-
five percent of the aggregate households’ net worth in America.119 Citizens’ 
policy-level data do not include home values, but they do list the zip codes of 
the insured properties. Thus, we were able to use publicly available 
information about median household value within the zip code in which the 
insured property is located.120 It is of course likely that less affluent households 
are blended into the pools that we count as wealthy (those in high-median-
home-value zip codes), but this measure allows us to look at overall trends in 
average subsidy allocations. 
(ii) Coverage Limit1: Citizens’ policy-level data include an entry for the 
amount of insurance purchased under each policy. Since insurance law does  
not allow the purchase of coverage exceeding the value of the property, we can 
use the coverage amount as an estimate of the lower bound of the property’s 
value.121 This will help us test whether people who own lower-valued homes 
receive a greater or smaller insurance subsidy.122 
 
 119. Alfred Gottschalck et al., Household Wealth in the U.S.: 2000 to 2011 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20Highlights%202011.pdf. 
 120. See American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav 
/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml (to locate, under “Advanced Search,” enter “B25077: 
MEDIAN VALUE (DOLLARS)” into the “topic or table name” search field and any 
given location into the “state, county or place (optional)” search field, which will yield 
the desired median household value) (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 121. Using the policy coverage limit as a proxy for property value, and thus indirectly for 
affluence, assumes that people with higher-value homes purchase higher insurance 
coverage. While we do not have direct evidence that this assumption is valid, it relies 
on several observations. First, coverage limits are dictated by the size of the mortgage, 
and higher-value homes carry higher mortgages. Second, higher-value homes are 
owned by households with larger net worth and a more valuable portfolio of other 
assets, which are therefore more likely to be able to afford the insurance premiums. See 
Gottschalck et al., supra note 119 (showing that a substantial portion of aggregate U.S. 
households’ net worth is comprised of home equity). Finally, the “indemnity principle” 
in insurance law does not allow policyholders to purchase coverage exceeding their 
actual losses, and so we can rule out that high-coverage policies are purchased by low-
value homes. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 93[a], at 
676 (3d ed. 2002). 
 122. In the year from which our data were taken (2012), there was no upper limit on the 
value of properties or the amount of coverage in Citizens’ policies. In 2014, however, a 
limit adopted by the Florida legislature became effective. See Act of June 13, 2014,        
ch. 140, § 1, 2014 Fla. Laws 1893, 1894-95 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.                        
§ 627.351(6)(a)(3) (2015)). Specifically, under current law, Citizens is only permitted to 
provide coverage for a dwelling up to a replacement cost of $1 million in 2014, with 
this limit going down by $100,000 per year until 2017, when the cap will remain at 
$700,000. Id. However, if policyholders can demonstrate that they are not able to find 
coverage in the private market for policies in the range between $700,000 and  
footnote continued on next page 
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To further visualize the relation between subsidy and wealth, we used the 
zip-code-level household-value data. For each zip code, we know the median 
household value, and we computed the average dollar value subsidy for all 
Citizens’ policies issued in that zip code, taken from Citizens’ policy-level data. 





















* The relation between absolute insurance premium subsidy and median household 
value. Each observation on the graph represents a Florida zip code region (N=904). 
 
The trend line is positive, suggesting that zip codes with higher-valued 
homes receive higher per-policy subsidies. 
A similar picture emerges if we look at policy-level data and ask whether 
high-value insurance policies (those presumably attached to high-value homes) 
receive a higher or lower subsidy. Before we turn to the connection between 
the value of the homeowners’ insurance policy and the size of the subsidy, let 
us first provide a rough picture of the range of coverage limits found in the 
data. As it turned out, the lowest coverage limit in the dataset (presumably for 
the policy covering the lowest-valued home in the dataset) was for $29,200.123 
 
$1 million and that there is “not a reasonable degree of competition,” then the 
$1 million cap will apply, rather than the lower phased-in caps in later years. Id. 
 123. We used the coverage limits for “Coverage A,” which is for damage or loss to the house 
or “dwelling unit.” See Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 115, at 3. 
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The highest coverage limit was for $1,000,000. The mean was $228,888. And the 
median was $196,700. The policies broke down further as follows:  
 
Table 2 









99% $745,000  
 
Thus, the smallest 1% of the policies had coverage limits of $92,000 or less, 
the smallest 5% had coverage limits of $113,600 or less, and so on. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the top 10% had coverage limits of $361,800 or greater, and 
the top 1% had coverage limits of $745,000 or greater. 
To link these coverage limits, and thus (indirectly) home values, with the 
size of Citizens’ subsidies, we divided Citizens’ policies into five quintiles 
according to the policy coverage amount. For each quintile, we calculated the 
average subsidy. Again, we see a clear picture: higher quintiles of wealth get a 
higher absolute subsidy.124  
 
 124. Each quintile had a high and a median coverage limit as follows: 
  Quintile 1: high, $144,300; median, $126,900; 
  Quintile 2: high, $177,900; median, $160,800; 
  Quintile 3: high, $217,600; median, $196,700; 
  Quintile 4: high, $283,300; median, $246,000; and 
  Quintile 5: high, $1,000,000; median, $361,800. 
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Figure 4 
















b. Empirical analysis 
In order to measure the disproportionate benefit of the insurance subsidy 
on the affluent, we used Citizens’ policy-level data. For each policy, we looked 
at two measures of subsidy. First, we looked at the straightforward “absolute 
subsidy,” which is the difference between the premium charged and the 
hypothetical premium reflecting full risk. Since Citizens reports the “indicated 
rate change” necessary to bring the actual premium to the full-risk level, this 
absolute subsidy for each policy is simply the premium charged for that policy 
times the indicated rate change for that policy. 
But the absolute subsidy may tell an incomplete story. A $300 subsidy for a 
low-coverage policy of, say, $50,000, may be a relatively more significant factor 
than a $500 subsidy for a high-coverage policy of $500,000. We therefore 
wanted to measure the relative subsidy each policy is getting. To do this, we 
created a synthetic benchmark in which the subsidy pool (the total amount of 
subsidy for all policies within the dataset) is divided pro rata across the policies, 
under the (counterfactual) assumption that all policies receive the same 
indicated rate change—the same percent discount. We denoted this benchmark 
as a “unit subsidy,” with all policies receiving exactly one unit. We then 
compared this unit-subsidy benchmark with the actual percent discount each 
policy received. This created a distribution of “percent subsidies,” some 
receiving more than the unit benchmark, others receiving less. We measured 
whether this “percent subsidy” distribution was correlated with household 
wealth. Wealth, recall, is measured in our estimates in two different ways: 
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We estimated two regression models: 
 
LogAbsoluteSubsidyi = α + β LogWealthi + εi 
 
PercentSubsidyi = α + β LogWealthi + εi 
 
The first model examines how an increase in wealth correlates with the 
absolute subsidy. A one percent increase in wealth is associated with a β percent 
increase in the absolute subsidy. If β is positive, there is positive correlation 
between wealth and subsidy, and the government’s program is regressive. 
Table 1 presents our findings.  
 
Table 3 
Regressions Using Log Absolute Subsidy 





















1.052*** 1.052*** 1.052*** 1.052*** 
(252.20) (252.22) (13.64) (13.64) 
“Wind” Type 
Policy 
0.108* 0.108* -0.0118 
(2.56) (2.56) (-0.05) 




-7.645*** -7.647*** -7.645*** -7.647*** -0.675 -0.675 
(-150.40) (-150.42) (-8.13) (-8.14) (-0.47) (-0.47) 
N 339,046 339,046 339,046 339,046 339,038 339,038 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.05     **p<0.01      ***p<0.001 
 
The results, which are statistically significant, demonstrate a significant 
correlation between wealth and subsidy. Column (1) in Table 3 shows that a 
one percent increase in the Coverage variable is associated with a 1.052% 
increase in the subsidy. Simply put, if property A is worth twice as much as 
property B, and thus the owner of property A purchases coverage that is 100% 
greater than the coverage purchased by the owner of property B, the owner of 
A enjoys on average a 105% higher absolute subsidy. Columns (2)-(4) repeat this 
test, and obtain the same result, with fixed effects for policy, standard errors 
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clustered by territory, and both.125 Column (5) uses a different independent 
variable to measure wealth—the average household value within the insured 
home’s zip code (Log HH Value). The wealth coefficient is smaller, 0.484% 
(predictably, given the use of average wealth measures; such averages dilute the 
effect of high and low wealth, and with less variation we expect to get smaller 
effects).126  
The second model examines the relation between wealth and our 




Regression with Percent Subsidies 





















0.847*** 0.796*** 0.847*** 0.796*** 
(126.81) (117.87) (8.04) (7.51) 
“Wind” Type 
Policy 
0.806*** 0.806* 0.945*** 
(46.64) (2.36) (3.55) 




-8.320*** -7.914*** -8.320*** -7.914*** -4.890** -4.090* 
(-101.61) (-96.30) (-6.45) (-6.26) (-2.93) (-2.51) 
N 527,250 527,250 527,250 527,250 527,236 527,236 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.05     **p<0.01      ***p<0.001 
 
 125. “Fixed effects” are variables added to a regression to account for the possibility that 
some policy types may receive higher or lower subsidies regardless of the 
policyholder’s wealth (or other attributes). By including fixed effects for policy, the 
regression measures the relationship between wealth and subsidy while controlling for 
the fact that wealthier households may tend to hold different types of policies than less 
wealthy households. “Clustered standard errors” calculates standard errors in a way 
that relaxes the usual assumption that errors (such as measurement error) for all 
observations are uncorrelated with all other observations. Instead, it allows for 
observations within a grouping (such as territory; the grouping is called a “cluster”) to 
have errors that are correlated with each other. For example, clustering of errors by 
territory accounts for the possibility that the relationship between wealth and subsidy 
is different in some territories for unknown reasons. 
 126. Column (6) repeats this test adding fixed effect by policy. Both Columns (5) and (6)’s 
standard errors are clustered by zip code. 
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Again, the subsidy is strongly correlated with wealth. A 1% increase in 
household value is associated with either a 0.847% or 0.571% increase in percent 
subsidy, depending on how we measure wealth, and the results are again highly 
significant. 
c. Discussion 
The results reported above show that the wind insurance subsidies within 
policies sold by Citizens Property Insurance Company accrue 
disproportionately to affluent households, and the magnitude of this regressive 
redistribution is substantial. While we are unable to measure directly the 
wealth of policyholders, we showed that people who buy higher coverage 
(namely, who presumably own more expensive homes), or, alternatively, 
people who live in wealthier zip codes, receive larger subsidies, both in 
absolute magnitude and as a percent of their premium. 
The estimates of the correlation between wealth and subsidy probably 
understate the true magnitude of the proaffluent advantage. First, one of our 
measures of wealth—policy coverage limit—is capped by state law, which 
means that we are not measuring the true wealth of the people who buy 
maximal coverage, and are therefore deriving downward-biased correlations. 
Second, Citizens’ report of the subsidies—the indicated rate changes—
understates the subsidies’ true magnitude because Citizens does not take into 
account some of the costs of providing insurance—costs that private insurers 
would incur in running an insurance scheme. Specifically, when Citizens 
calculates the amount of the indicated rate change, it does not build into it the 
cost of reinsurance—an insurance reserve necessary to protect it against the 
risk of pricing errors or unexpected spikes in losses.127 Citizens does not need 
to require such a reserve because of its power, in effect, to tax the citizenry or 
to assess all insurance purchasers in the state of Florida. 
We have not tried to identify the causal story underlying this correlation, 
nor are we interested in its direction. Causation may go either way: greater 
wealth may help people secure greater subsidies; or greater subsidies may help 
people move into more expensive homes. We are not interested in causation 
because the troubling feature of the system has nothing to do with any causal 
theory. The problem is the large positive correlation between wealth and 
subsidy, a correlation that conflicts with the goals and underlying rhetoric 
justifying the program.128 
We have not, of course, attempted to identify the precise incidence of the 
subsidy. Economic theory suggests that, even if the nominal beneficiaries of the 
subsidy are the relatively wealthy purchasers of homeowners’ insurance, the 
 
 127. See Donovan Discussions, supra note 77. 
 128. For information on the goals and underlying rhetoric justifying the program, see text 
accompanying notes 92-99 above. 
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actual incidence of the subsidy would be split between the home buyers and the 
home sellers, with the precise effects depending on elasticities of the supply of 
and demand for housing in the relevant areas. The distinction between buyers 
and sellers is irrelevant for our purposes because we are interested in the 
overall magnitude of benefit to the inhabitants of coastal property, not how this 
benefit is divided between sequential owners.  
3. Redistribution under the NFIP 
As we saw in Part II, the NFIP insures nearly five million properties, up to 
$500,000 per residential property.129 The program is not designed to be 
financially balanced. In fact, subsidized rates were thought by lawmakers to be 
an inducement for communities to participate in the program and adopt flood 
mitigation requirements for buildings and floodplains management.130 
Although in most years the NFIP collects enough premiums to cover each 
year’s claims, a few catastrophic events more than wipe out the NFIP’s reserves. 
As of 2014, the NFIP’s debt exceeded $24 billion and existing rate-setting 
practices were “unlikely to be able to cover the program’s claims, expenses, and 
debt, exposing the federal government and ultimately taxpayers to ever-
greater financial risks, especially in years of catastrophic flooding.”131 
As a result of the discounts, people insured by the NFIP pay only a fraction 
of the full-risk premium. In 2006, FEMA estimated this fraction to be between 
35% and 40%.132 The subsidy is, on average, close to two-thirds of the economic 
cost. An average premium charged by the NFIP was $721, but would cost 
between $1800 and $2060 if priced to cover full risk.133 In the areas with the 
highest risk of floods, the fraction of full risk paid by policyholders is even 
lower.134 
A 2007 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that 
“properties that carry flood insurance tend to be more valuable as a group.”135 
At the time, the median value of a home in the United States was $160,000; the 
median value estimated for homes insured by the NFIP ranged from $220,000 
 
 129. See Summary of the NFIP June 2014 Program Changes 1 (2013), http://www 
.nfipiservice.com/Stakeholder/FEMA2/Attachment%20A%20Summary%20of%20the 
%20NFIP%20June%202014%20Program%20Changes.pdf.  
 130. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 59, at 7. 
 131. Id. at 27. 
 132. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 117, at 3. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CHARGING 
ACTUARIALLY BASED PREMIUM RATES FOR PRE-FIRM STRUCTURES 5-4, 5-5 fig.5.1 (1999), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602-20490-9031/finalreport.pdf 
(“For structures six feet or more below the [base flood elevation], premiums would 
likely rise from about $590 to about $6,800 as a result of subsidy elimination.”). 
 135. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 117, at 2, 6. 
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to $400,000.136 The CBO found that “[m]uch of the difference is attributable to 
the higher property values in areas that are close to water.”137 There are  
130 million housing units in the United States, but only a small fraction of 
them receive subsidized NFIP policies.138 Of those that do, nearly eighty 
percent are located in counties that rank in the wealthiest quintile.139 
Despite the image—often invoked in political debates over flood 
insurance140—of the subsidy going to struggling middle-class homeowners 
who have lived for generations in floodplains, the reality is different. As the 
CBO found, “40 percent of subsidized coastal properties in the sample are 
worth more than $500,000; 12 percent are worth more than $1 million.”141 
These are far higher proportions than in the rest of the country. For inland 
properties (the great majority of which do not purchase flood insurance), only 
12% are worth more than $500,000 and only 3% more than $1 million.142  
The myth of the subsidized struggling homeowner is further dispelled by 
another striking fact: 23% of subsidized coastal properties are not the 
policyholders’ principal residence—they are either vacation homes or year-
round rentals.143 Indeed, these subsidized second homes in coastal areas are 
generally higher in value than the subsidized principal residences in the same 
coastal areas ($634,000 versus $530,000).144 Thus, even among the group of 
beneficiaries who live along the coast and who disproportionately enjoy the 
subsidy, second-homers are the bigger gainers from the subsidy. Again 
according to the CBO, 47% of the subsidized homes that are not principal 
residences are worth more than $500,000 (and 15% are worth more than  
$1 million).145 
Another indication that wealthier households enjoy the NFIP subsidy is 
the fraction of homes that purchase the maximum coverage. Low-value homes 
owned by lower-income residents do not need (and are ineligible for) the 
maximum coverage; high-value homes do. In 2002, only 11% of NFIP policies 
 
 136. Id. at 2. 
 137. Id.; see also Holladay & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 375. But see Bin et al., supra note 31, at 
10 (looking at NFIP premiums and payout data and concluding that the program 
overall reduces certain measures of inequality). 
 138. Eli Lehrer, Doing the Wrong Thing, WKLY. STANDARD (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://tws.io/1nSsdZt. 
 139. Id. 
 140. For information on the goals and underlying rhetoric justifying the program, see text 
accompanying notes 92-99 above. 
 141. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 117, at 2. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 9. 
 144. Id. at 10. 
 145. Id. at 11. 
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were at maximum limit.146 By 2012, the fraction increased to 42%, with most of 
these high-coverage homes located in the Gulf Coast and along the East 
Coast.147 For example, in New York (with a median home value of $285,300), 
65% of its policyholders had the maximum coverage.148 In contrast, in West 
Virginia (a median home value of $99,300), only 7% of its policyholders had 
maximum coverage.149 
Finally, the benefit to coastal areas, which tend to have higher property 
value, accrues in another, less direct way. Participation in the NFIP requires 
communities to develop floodplain management plans. Such investments 
reduce flood risk and increase the land available for new construction.150 In 
effect, “[t]he NFIP, by serving as a backstop for those risks, favors development 
in communities with floodplains, by shifting some of those risks onto 
taxpayers.”151 Development in floodplains becomes more affordable, and 
private markets then naturally divert development investments to areas with 
high property values.152 These communities are thus more likely to be eligible 
for NFIP participation.  
B. Investment Distortions 
In Part III.A above, we asked whether government insurance produces the 
desirable distributive effects aspired for by its political proponents—improving 
affordability among lower-income residents of storm-prone areas. We saw 
that the opposite is true—that the benefits of the program flow 
disproportionately to the affluent. We now turn to examine another troubling 
distortion of the existing government insurance programs: the effect on 
societal welfare and the waste of resources they entail. 
1. Regulation of location 
In choosing the location of development (and redevelopment), people have 
to estimate the perils of particular sites. Coastal areas are attractive for many 
salient reasons, which feature prominently in buyers’ calculations. The 
downside—exposure to severe storms—is recognized in the abstract, but hard 
to quantify.  
 
 146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 41, at 10-12. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Holladay & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 4. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 
68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016) 
612 
Insurance, if priced accurately, provides an important service of 
quantifying the risk and helping people trade it off against the upsides.153 This 
is a general (desirable) feature of insurance, operating in effect like a Pigouvian 
tax in internalizing an otherwise-overlooked cost.154 Knowing the expected 
cost of exposure to weather disasters, people are more likely to make an 
informed cost-benefit calculation in choosing locations. Subsidized insurance 
rates destroy the information value of full-risk premiums, thus suppressing the 
true cost of living in severe-weather zones, and creating an excessive incentive 
to populate attractive but dangerous locations. It is a moral hazard problem 
occurring at the dimension of the activity level. 
We saw that the NFIP charges subsidized premiums deliberately to make 
insurance affordable.155 This intent was punctuated by the enactment of the so-
called Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which scaled 
back premium increases that intended to eliminate the subsidies. But there are 
additional, unintentional causes for the inaccurate premiums set by the NFIP. 
First, the data it relies on in drawing flood maps are outdated. Despite the 
efforts to update and modernize the maps, the long lapses between such 
adjustments are indicative of the inadequate political or financial incentives to 
run an actuarially accurate system. For example, Hurricane Sandy exposed the 
inadequacy of FEMA’s old flood maps and led to an updating of high-risk areas’ 
boundaries. Under the new maps, “[a] $429 annual premium on a structure 
previously outside the high-risk zones could well rise to $5,000 to $10,000 for 
the same amount of coverage if it is inside the high-risk area.”156  
Second, the NFIP charges subsidized premiums because it allows certain 
properties to maintain their previous, historically low rates, despite data 
showing a greater risk. FEMA does not even collect data on these 
grandfathered properties to measure their financial impact on the program or 
keep track of how many of these properties there are. Further, the agency sets 
flood insurance rates on a nationwide basis using rough averages, which means 
that many factors relevant to flood risk are not specifically accounted for in 
rating individual properties.157 Normally such crude averaging would lead to 
adverse selection and unraveling, as low-risk properties should prefer to exit 
and join separate pools with actuarially fair policies, rather than subsidize 
other neighborhoods. But if the government subsidy is deep enough, it can 
offset this effect. Finally, as a government report conceded, “FEMA’s rate-
 
 153. See Hecht, supra note 21, 1565-67 (making a similar point, especially in the connection 
with weather risk). 
 154. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 232-34. 
 155. See supra Parts II.B, III.A.1, III.A.3.  
 156. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., FLOOD INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY FOLLOWING 
HURRICANE SANDY 17 (2013). 
 157. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 59, at 12, 23, which recommends 
that FEMA adopt more precise rate-setting methodology to reflect risk “accurately.” 
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setting process also does not fully take into account ongoing and planned 
development, long-term trends in erosion, or the effects of global climate 
change, although private sector models are incorporating some of these 
factors.”158  
Underpricing of flood insurance in coastal areas has long been associated 
with (and likely contributed to) excessive private development of flood zones. 
As the same congressional report concluded, “FEMA . . . is unable, through its 
rate-setting process, to inform policyholders of the risk to their property from 
erosion. Consequently, in some cases flood insurance rates may send a false 
signal that understates the risk exposure faced by current policyholders or 
prospective development.”159  
This insight is increasingly appreciated even beyond the debate over 
FEMA’s subsidies. For example, in writing about Florida’s Citizens’ wind 
insurance scheme, Michael Lewis explains that Florida “sold its citizens 
catastrophe insurance at roughly one-sixth the market rates, thus encouraging 
them to live in riskier places than they would if they had to pay what the 
market charged.”160  
Indeed, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of people living 
in coastal areas in Florida increased by ten million, almost fourfold, between 
1960 and 2008.161 (Overall U.S. population grew by only 70% at the same 
time.162) Coastal exposure now represents 79% of all property exposure in 
Florida, with an insured value of $2.9 trillion (in 2013).163 Major hurricanes did 
nothing to stop this migration. It is estimated that since Hurricane Andrew 
struck the Florida coast in 1992, development more than doubled the property 
value in its path. The $25 billion in total economic losses in 1992 “would have 
resulted in more than twice that amount—$55 billion—were it to have 
 
 158. Id. at 4.  
 159. Id. at 21-22. 
 160. Lewis, supra note 106. 
 161. The population of Florida increased from 4,951,560 in 1960 to 18,328,340 in 2008. 
Compare U.S. Census Bureau, No. 1960-565788/44, Number of Inhabitants: Florida 11-8 
tbl.2 (n.d.), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/11085788v1p11ch2 
.pdf, with U.S. Census Bureau, NST-EST2008-01, Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 
1, 2008 (2008), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2000s/vintage_2008 
/state.html.  
 162. The U.S. population rose from 179,323,175 in 1960 to 304,059,724 in 2008, per U.S. 
Census Bureau estimates. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, 
AREA MEASUREMENTS, AND DENSITY: 1790 TO 1990 (1993), http://www.census.gov 
/population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf, with U.S. Census Bureau, NST-
EST2008-01, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, 
Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (2008), 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2000s/vintage_2008. 
 163. Florida Hurricane Insurance: Fact File, INS. INFO. INST. (Oct. 2015), http://www.iii.org 
/article/florida-hurricane-insurance-fact-file. 
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occurred in 2005, given current asset values.”164 This is net of inflation—
namely normalizing losses by holding constant the value of building material, 
real estate, and other societal changes, thus measuring the losses that would 
have occurred in 1992 if societal conditions were those of 2005. 
The effects of climate change on weather patterns are only beginning to be 
understood, but private insurers are rushing to take these emerging patterns 
into account, adjusting premiums in light of near-future projections, and 
studying potential industry-wide impacts and strategies to proactively address 
the rising risk.165 FEMA, on the other hand,  
has done little to develop the kind of information needed to understand the long-
term exposure of NFIP to climate change for a variety of reasons. . . . NFIP’s risk 
management processes adapt to near-term changes in weather as they affect 
existing data. As a result, NFIP is designed to assess and insure against current—
not future—risks and currently does not have the information necessary to adjust 
rates for the potential impacts of events associated with climate.166  
If, indeed, climate change poses increased risks of flood and erosion to low-
lying coastal zones, the failure of government insurance to price that risk into 
present policies exacerbates the overdevelopment problem.  
An independent report, published in the year 2000, of erosion rates and 
their financial impact found that over the next sixty years following the 
report, erosion may claim one out of four houses within 500 feet of the U.S. 
shoreline, as Figure 5 below illustrates.167 
 
 164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-285, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCIAL RISKS 
TO FEDERAL AND PRIVATE INSURERS IN COMING DECADES ARE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT 
25 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/257686.pdf. 
 165. See, e.g., Evan Mills, Responding to Climate Change—The Insurance Industry Perspective, in 
CLIMATE ACTION 100 (2007), http://www.unep.org/pdf/climate_action_book_lowres 
.pdf (stating how climate change could cause over a trillion dollars of losses to 
insurance companies in a single year and therefore is a huge problem facing insurers); 
Alberto Monti, Climate Change and Weather-Related Disasters: What Role for Insurance, 
Reinsurance and Financial Sectors?, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 151, 159 
(2009) (“Climate change . . . poses serious threats for the insurance and reinsurance 
sectors worldwide.”); Eugene Linden, Opinion, How the Insurance Industry Sees Climate 
Change, L.A. TIMES (1June 16, 2014, 8:42 PM), http://fw.to/8Qhns3D (discussing how  
a major insurance company has taken steps to help protect itself from the threat  
of global warming); Jessie G. Rountree, Risky Business: Recommendations for  
the Insurance Industry to Contribute to Greater Disaster Risk Reduction and  
Climate Change Adaptation 27 (May 16, 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
San Francisco), http://repository.usfca.edu/capstone/20 (proposing using risk-based 
premiums to reflect global warming’s likely impact in order to protect the insurance 
industry and influence consumer behavior). 
 166. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 59, at 22. 
 167. H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & ENV’T, EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS, at 
xxv (2000). 
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However, the NFIP does not map erosion hazard and does not incorporate 
it into the insurance rate. As a result, according to the report, rates are set at 
approximately half of actuarially accurate rates. “Despite facing higher risk, 
homeowners in erosion-prone areas currently are paying the same amount for 
flood insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding areas.”169 Not only will 
erosion claims have to be subsidized, but present insurance rates are also 
“misleading to users” because they do not inform homeowners of the erosion 
 
 168. Figure 5 is appropriated from Evaluation of Erosion Hazards. Id. at xxiii fig.S.1. 
 169. Id. at xxi box S.1. 
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risk.170 As a result, the report finds that development in erosion areas is 
excessive. “In the absence of insurance and other programs to reduce flood risk, 
development density would be about 25 percent lower in the highest-risk 
zones than in areas less susceptible to damage from coastal flooding.”171 
The effect of the government insurance subsidy on homeowners’ location 
decisions can be further captured by another of the report’s findings. In some of 
the areas closest to the shoreline, annual rates have to be set at $11.40 per $100 
of coverage to meet the risk projections—over ten percent of property value 
each year.172 At the same time, a survey of homeowners found that 
participation in insurance schemes with such high premiums would be “quite 
low”—about half of flood policyholders are willing to pay only up to “$1-
$2/year per $100 of coverage” for erosion insurance.173 
Not surprisingly, given the substantial subsidy provided by NFIP 
insurance and the increased development along coastal areas, the number of 
policies issued by the NFIP has increased since 1980 from 1.9 million to over  
4.6 million as of 2005.174 Since the population at large grew significantly, this 
growth in enrollment means that many current policyholders moved to the 
area only post-NFIP, attracted in part by the subsidized exposure to risk. Many 
of these newcomers would not have moved to their present high-risk location, 
or would not have paid the same top dollar, in the absence of subsidized 
premiums. Indeed, one of the major complaints of existing homeowners 
against the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 (which, recall, dramatically scaled back 
the NFIP subsidies) was its price tag: the new premiums exceeded homeowners’ 
ability to pay and scared away potential buyers, making mortgage loans 
unaffordable.175 
2. Regulation of precautions 
Insurance contracts affect not only the scope of activity, but also the level 
of care taken by policyholders. Auto insurance, for example, can induce people 
 
 170. Id. at xxxiv (“[B]ecause current flood maps do not incorporate erosion risk, they are not 
only incomplete but also misleading to users.”). 
 171. Id. at xl box S.5. 
 172. Id. at xliv. 
 173. Id. at xliv-xlv. 
 174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 164, at 27. 
 175. See, e.g., Josh Boatwright, Flood Rate Fears Sink Condo Sales, ST. PETERSBURG TRIB.  
(Dec. 21, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.tbo.com/pinellas-county/flood-rate-fears-sink 
-sales-20131221/ (“[S]tories of skyrocketing flood insurance premiums on older 
properties scared away many buyers.”); Kathleen Lynn, North Jersey Homeowners 
Trapped in Flood Zones Looking for Help from Feds, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Feb. 26, 2014, 
11:29 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/real-estate/rising-flood-insurance-premiums 
-make-homes-impossible-to-sell-1.735866 (“Many homeowners want to sell, but flood 
insurance costs have scared away buyers.”). 
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to drive more carefully (through experience rating); environmental liability 
insurance can induce firms to install spill prevention measures; and fire 
insurance can induce proprietors to invest in sprinklers.176 How does 
government insurance of weather risk perform as a risk mitigation 
mechanism? Historically, not very well. As discussed above, the flood maps 
used by FEMA to administer the NFIP are notoriously out of date.177 And even 
when they are up to date, the premiums are heavily subsidized for many 
properties in the highest-risk areas, giving little incentive to install loss-
reducing measures.178  
This situation seemed to be changing after the enactment of Biggert-
Waters in 2012, as rapid premium increases began to induce behavioral 
changes on the part of property owners.179 Under the new maps that were to 
be used, the affordability of insurance depended upon, among other things, 
how high one’s home was built above certain expected flood levels. 
Homeowners rebuilding in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut following 
Hurricane Sandy were induced to invest in stilts, raising their homes above the 
base flood elevation.180 Whether this trend will continue now that Biggert-
Waters has been cut back remains to be seen. 
Compared to flood mitigation, the role of government insurance in 
encouraging wind mitigation is perhaps more encouraging, although it is 
difficult to know for certain. In Florida, for example, Citizens provides 
discounts to any of its policyholders who can demonstrate that the property 
they are insuring meets a list of highly detailed design specifications.181 Indeed, 
in Florida all insurers—private and public—are required by statute to provide 
 
 176. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 220-26. 
 177. See supra Part II.A. 
 178. See supra Part III. 
 179. See, e.g., Joanna M. Foster, The Jersey Shore Rebuilds Higher After Superstorm Sandy,  
THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 21, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/04/21 
/3429081/new-jersey-elevates-houses (discussing the large number of houses that were 
rebuilt in an elevated fashion because of insurance discounts offered for elevated 
houses); Scott Gurian, Explainer1: Putting Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act in 
Perspective, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/11 
/explainer-putting-biggert-waters-flood-insurance-reform-act-in-perspective (detailing 
some possible changes resulting from the legislation in the “What It Would Mean for 
Residents of the Shore” section).  
 180. Tara Siegel Bernard, Rebuilding After Sandy, but with Costly New Rules, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 10, 2013), http://nyti.ms/15XAvVq (“Consider a single-family home in a zone 
with a moderate to high risk of a flood, that has a flood policy with $250,000 of 
coverage: if the home is four feet below the base flood elevation, the homeowner would 
pay an annual premium of about $9,500, according to FEMA. But if the home was 
elevated to the base, the premium would cost $1,410. Hoist the home three feet higher, 
and the premium would drop to $427.”).  
 181. See Your Wind Inspection, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citizensfla.com/web 
/public/your-wind-inspection (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (linking in bottom right-hand 
column to actual wind mitigation inspection forms used by Citizens). 
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such discounts.182 Because wind mitigation discounts in Florida are a matter of 
statutory mandate, it is impossible to determine what sorts of wind mitigation 
discounts a private insurer, absent such a mandate, would be willing to provide. 
A similar picture can be seen in other coastal states.183 For this reason, it is 
difficult to document a care-level advantage on the part of private insurers 
with respect to coastal wind mitigation.  
It is easy to see, however, the considerable activity-level advantage that 
private insurance has over government insurance of coastal weather risk. If 
private insurers were permitted to charge what the market would bear for 
coastal weather risk (and were not limited by state insurance regulators), the 
prices would be considerably higher than they currently are, especially for the 
riskiest communities living close to water. Whereas wind and flood insurance 
premiums may not constitute a large fraction of the premium paid by most 
homeowners (and therefore privatization of those risks may have little 
incentive effect on many people), for those living in the riskiest areas—along 
the coast, for example—the story is very different. Fully privatized weather 
insurance would likely lead to dramatic changes in premiums, which might 
result in significant long-run effects on real estate development. This claim is 
supported by anecdotal evidence.184 It is supported by the short experience of 
rate hikes under the Biggert-Waters Act, which “scare[d] the bejesus out of 
people.”185 And it is supported by Citizens’ data, where the subsidies for coastal 
wind insurance reflect the difference between what Citizens actually charges 
for such risks and what an actuarially accurate insurance premium would be.  
 
 182. FLA. STAT. § 627.711(1) (2015). 
 183. See generally Travelers Inst., Highlights and Lessons Learned from a National 
Symposium Series on Coastal Insurance Issues (2009), https://www.travelers.com 
/about-us/spotlight/docs/TRV_Coastal_Wind_Zone_Web.pdf (discussing insurance 
symposia held in South Carolina, Texas, and Alabama and discussing the need in those 
states for market-based wind insurance reform). 
 184. State Farm, for example, recently sought approval from the Louisiana insurance 
regulator for an average statewide premium increase of 15.2%, but was forced to settle 
for an 8.7% increase. See Ted Griggs, State Farm Hurricane Deductible Jumps to 5%, 
ADVOCATE (1July 8, 2014, 6:51 PM), http://theadvocate.com/news/9671144-123/state 
-farm-hurricane-deductible-jumps. 
 185. Dan Burley, Flood Insurance Rates Skyrocket for Some in Beaufort County, BEAUFORT 
GAZETTE (Oct. 12, 2013, 10:41 PM), http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/10/12/2735480 
/flood-insurance-rates-skyrocket.html (quoting local realty broker). Some reports 
suggested that flood insurance rates for some jumped from $500 per year “into the 
$5,000-, $10,000- and even $20,000-a-year range and higher.” Terrell Johnson, 
Skyrocketing Flood Insurance Rates Bring Financial Chaos, Heartache to Coastal Homeowners 
Across U.S., WEATHER CHANNEL (Sept. 28, 2013, 3:08 PM EDT), http://www.weather 
.com/science/environment/news/new-flood-insurance-rules-bring-chaos-heartache 
-coastal-homeowners-20130927. 
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IV. Responding to Concerns About Market (and Government) 
Failures in Private Weather Insurance 
Insurance for weather risk is subsidized by the government. Either 
through disaster relief or through individually purchased insurance policies, 
people living in the zone of disaster pay only a fraction of the expected cost of 
their decision where to live. It is a subsidy program with great political 
support, resting on a popular belief that the program is both fair and efficient. 
This Article has shown that both perceptions are wrong. In delivering a 
subsidy that private insurance does not give, government insurance inflicts 
two distortions: regressive redistribution and inefficient investment in 
residential property. These distortions are not inherent in the function of 
insurance. They can be reduced, and perhaps eliminated, by a return to private 
insurance markets. 
In the course of developing this argument—the comparative performance 
of government versus private insurance—one cannot overlook the primary 
rationale for government takeover of insurance for certain types of extreme 
weather risk: market penetration.186 The argument is straightforward: when 
insurance is provided through a relief fund or with significant subsidies, 
coverage can extend beyond what private insurance markets provide and 
resolve the market failures of private insurance.187 Weather risk, it is alleged, 
is one such circumstance. In this Part, we examine the concern about market 
failures in the provision of private insurance. In addition, we address potential 
governance failures that could inhibit the attempt to use a more market-based 
approach. 
One possible concern with private insurance for weather risk is 
underinsurance. Perhaps because of cognitive failures, homeowners often buy 
too little property insurance coverage for their dwellings.188 For example, it is 
estimated that only twenty-one percent of homeowners in high-flood-risk 
areas in New York City who are not subject to a flood insurance mandate 
under their mortgage contract actually purchase flood coverage, even at 
subsidized rates.189 However, severe weather is an odd area for such a cognitive 
bias argument to be made. Surely people notice reports about weather disasters. 
 
 186. See Christopher Matthews, Should the Federal Government Be Subsidizing Flood  
Insurance?, TIME (Oct. 30, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/10/30/should-the-federal 
-government-be-subsidizing-flood-insurance (positing that the federal government 
began the NFIP to fix a market failure caused by prohibitively high insurer premiums, 
and by taking control of the market they were able to offer insurance at an affordable 
price).  
 187. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 28-29 (1996). 
 188. See Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party Insurance, 
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 14-27 (2008). 
 189. DIXON ET AL., supra note 156, at 16-17. 
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If anything, one would expect the risk of hurricane damage to be overly salient 
relative to other insured risks, thus triggering a salience bias in the other 
direction. Indeed, it is estimated that for every person who dies in a storm, 
more than 139 people must die from famine to receive the same expected media 
coverage.190 Thus, it is hard to attribute a market failure in flood insurance to 
cognitive biases that arise from distorted assessments of information. 
What is less surprising, perhaps, is the failure of homeowners to recognize 
that standard homeowners’ insurance policies exclude flood-caused damage. 
That is, most homeowners may simply not realize that their homeowners’ 
property coverage contains an exclusion for flood-caused losses, and that such 
coverage must be purchased separately as an add-on. Moreover, perhaps many 
homeowners are not aware of the extent to which weather-related damages 
tend to be attributed to flood.191 Notwithstanding mandated disclosures that 
alert people and remind them to purchase separate flood insurance, it is 
questionable whether such warnings appended to complex preprinted 
insurance policies could successfully inform people.192 The resulting gap in 
coverage is a market failure that government insurance can step in to correct.  
And yet, a more modest intervention could also resolve this problem. 
Instead of being the provider of insurance, the government could simply 
mandate flood insurance in areas where some costs are otherwise shifted to the 
public (as it does for homes with federally guaranteed mortgage loans). The 
mandate would usher people towards private insurance markets, without the 
need for government-subsidized policies; and if cognitive biases or systematic 
underestimation of the risk is the only problem, a coverage mandate may be all 
that is needed. Also, for reasons having to do with optimal tax theory, the 
mandate may not need to require full coverage; that is, given the existence of 
other nonadjusting taxes in the system, a mandate that calls for something less 
than full weather-risk coverage might be optimal.193 
 
 190. Thomas Eisensee & David Strömberg, News Droughts, News Floods, and U.S. Disaster 
Relief, 122 Q.J. ECON. 693, 723 tbl.vii (2007). 
 191. See, e.g., Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, How to Speak  
Flood. (2015), https://agents.floodsmart.gov/Agents/downloads/HowToSpeakFlood 
-AgentFieldGuide.pdf (addressing common consumer misconceptions that NFIP agents 
may encounter). 
 192. See Daniel R. Petrolia et al., Risk Preferences, Risk Perceptions, and Flood Insurance, 89 
LAND ECON. 227, 229 (2013); cf. Risa Palm & Michael Hodgson, Earthquake Insurance: 
Mandated Disclosure and Homeowner Response in California, 82 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 207, 211 (1992) (discussing studies showing that, despite mandated 
disclosure of fact that properties are in high-risk earthquake zone, most buyers did not 
purchase earthquake insurance). But see Carolyn Kousky, Learning from Extreme Events: 
Risk Perceptions After the Flood, 86 LAND ECON. 395, 419 (2010) (“Still, it is clear from this 
study that risk information does influence homeowners.”). 
 193. We have argued before that the mandate to purchase insurance has much the same 
effect as a Pigouvian tax in the weather-risk context and in other contexts as well. See 
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 232-34. Pigouvian taxes, as well as social-cost-
internalizing insurance mandates, can have their own distortionary effects. Cf. A. Lans 
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An alternative to mandating the purchase of flood or wind insurance at the 
consumer level would be to mandate that all property policies include (at least 
partial) coverage for flood damage. Currently, insurers insert exclusions for 
flood or hurricane damage, but these exclusions would be prohibited. Such 
lumping of flood coverage into the standard homeowners policy would 
counteract problems of cognitive failure on the part of insurance purchasers, 
create demand for weather-related coverage (which would cause investment 
capital to flow into the weather reinsurance market), and reduce the social 
costs of litigating over whether a particular loss is caused by wind or water.194 
And to the extent that the price of such inclusive policies would become 
unaffordable to low-income homeowners, targeted means-tested subsidies or 
vouchers could be offered.195 Such subsidies are better administered through 
the tax system, where they are made transparent (and thus more subject to 
voter and policymaker scrutiny) and where they are administered by 
regulators whose primary expertise is the design and enforcement of subsidies. 
Such subsidies would also cost less because they would eliminate all non-need-
based subsidies. 
A potential limitation of private insurance as weather-risk regulation 
involves the standard time period over which property insurance is written. 
Property policies in the United States are sold and priced on an annual basis,196 
which means the property insurer is obligated to cover losses sustained to the 
insured property during the year of coverage. As a result, individual property 
insurers may have insufficient incentives to invest in identifying the most 
effective risk-reducing strategies, as some portion of the benefits of these 
investments will redound to the benefit of future insurers.197 This effect is 
reduced when insurers pool resources industry-wide to engage in weather-risk 
research. It could also be counteracted if property insurance policies were sold 
as long-term (ten-year or even twenty-year) contracts, similar to home 
mortgages, which “run with the property.”198 That insurers do not presently 
offer multiyear polices is of course not evidence that such policies are 
 
Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of 
Other Taxes: General-Equilibrium Analyses, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 985, 994-95 (1996) (showing 
that in a world in which policymakers are constrained from optimizing all taxes 
simultaneously, the optimal Pigouvian tax will be less than the marginal social cost). 
The same would be true with respect to mandated insurance, suggesting that less than 
full coverage should be mandated. 
 194. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at 338-43 (proposing long-term 
property insurance policies as a way to avoid volatility in premiums across years).  
 195. See id. at 336. 
 196. See id. at 121 (“Individuals normally purchase insurance on an annual basis . . . .”). 
 197. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 230-31. 
 198. Others have written about the possibility of using long-term property policies to 
improve risk-reduction benefits of property insurance markets. See KUNREUTHER & 
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at 338-43. 
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inefficient, given the cross-time collective action problem already mentioned, 
and the usurpation of the market by government-provided policies. 
Another concern with private insurance for weather risk is the capacity to 
insure megadisasters. Weather-related risks are commonly regarded as only 
partially insurable because of the problem of risk correlation. It is conventional 
wisdom that private insurance markets will fail to perform their risk-
spreading function when the insured risks are correlated with each other—
when too many of the members of the insurance pool face the same risk and 
incur their loss in the same circumstances.199 That a number of insurers 
became insolvent in the aftermath of major hurricanes reinforces the notion 
that the most extreme cases of severe weather are just too big for private 
insurance to handle alone.200  
But is that in fact true? Is extreme weather risk actually uninsurable 
through private markets? At least since the 1990s, after the Northridge 
Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew disasters exposed the inadequacy of capital 
that was then being deployed in catastrophe reinsurance markets, concerns 
have been expressed about the “capacity” of private markets to handle the once-
in-a-generation disaster.201 In theory, it is not clear why even the largest 
storms should not be insurable, given the amount of capital available in the 
world to provide a hedge against such risks. Even large correlated risks on the 
local or national level are uncorrelated and manageable, in terms of risk 
spreading, on a global level. This is what reinsurance markets do: they take the 
risks insured by individual insurance companies around the world, pool them 
together, and then distribute them across investors worldwide.202 So why are 
so few assets allocated to catastrophe reinsurance markets? 
 
 199. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 
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if the risks faced by members of the pool are not statistically independent to some 
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Andrew). 
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insurance companies to manage risk); Steven Merkel, What is Reinsurance?, 
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A range of explanations has been offered for the apparent shortage of 
reinsurance capital, including tax incentives, agency costs, and exploitation of 
market power.203 At the same time, insurance markets have responded with a 
wave of financial innovation designed to increase the market’s supply of 
catastrophic reinsurance capacity.204 One of the most promising developments 
in building capital reserves for megacatastrophes has occurred in securities 
markets—the development of the catastrophic bond (cat bond).  
Cat bonds are tradable debt securities issued by insurers.205 They are sold 
to investors in capital markets and promise a generous interest rate. What 
distinguishes these bonds from regular debt instruments is that the payment of 
interest and the repayment of principal are contingent upon the 
nonoccurrence of some catastrophe-related trigger.206 Thus, if a megastorm 
occurs that triggers the cat bond, the insurer who issued the bonds is relieved 
from the obligation to redeem the bond. The insurer is in effect able to use the 
principal to cover storm-related losses. Thus, as the use of cat bonds has been 
expanding rapidly over the past two decades, the capacity for the private 
insurability of extreme-weather risks continues to expand as well.207 In the 
absence of publicly provided catastrophe insurance, this expansion would have 
likely been greater.  
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If the creation of adequate private insuring capacity for weather-related 
disasters is in fact inhibited by persistent market failures, there are government 
interventions that, unlike the NFIP, deploy market incentives to reduce risk. 
Congress could, for example, adopt a federal reinsurance regime for severe 
storms similar to the system it created for catastrophic terrorism risks in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks. Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), the 
first $27.5 billion of losses from a given act of terrorism (rising to $37.5 billion 
by 2020) is insured through private insurance markets, with the federal 
government providing 85% (falling to 80%) of the coverage above that 
threshold up to a cap of $100 billion.208 The best case for TRIA is that the 
retentions built into such a regime provide considerable incentive for insurers 
to compete on price, while eliminating the downside uncertainty associated 
with the truly cataclysmic disasters. The hope is that the gradually decreasing 
federal reinsurance will encourage the flow of private capital into the 
terrorism insurance business. Something similar could be done with 
catastrophic weather risk.209 
Conclusion 
Insuring capacity is not an insurmountable problem for private insurance 
of weather risk. However, affordability may well be. In areas subject to severe 
weather, private insurance is offered, but priced at full risk it is expensive and, 
for many, unaffordable. True, without insurance these homeowners would 
also be unable to rebuild their property if lost, and insuring it might be a 
rational cost-minimizing choice. But it is still a luxury that many cannot afford 
(and, as explained above, that many were not factoring in when moving to the 
area). Means-tested subsidies may be designed only for the truly needy,210 but 
short of a mandate to insure, many residents of hazard-prone areas would 
remain uninsured against weather devastation. What would happen in these 
communities after a disastrous storm? 
Collectively provided disaster relief is the common response. Major 
disasters have a way of arousing a strong urge to support the victims. Such 
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catastrophes generate an extraordinary amount of media attention and trigger 
a demand by the public to lend a collective hand—paid for by taxpayers—to the 
unlucky few, culminating in special legislative action to appropriate funds, 
such as the ones following the 9/11 attacks.211 
When the magnitude of destruction caused by weather disasters is 
exceptionally high relative to past trajectories—when they reach more victims 
at greater scale and cause deeper misery than prior patterns predict—ad hoc 
relief is set in motion. Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy are examples of such 
events, exceptional in the magnitude and scope of both the harm and 
destruction they inflicted on entire communities.212 The corresponding federal 
disaster relief for the 2005 hurricane season totaled $109 billion and the aid for 
Hurricane Sandy totaled $66 billion, respectively.213 Similar ad hoc relief 
followed unprecedented tornados, like the one that hit Joplin, Missouri, in 
2011.214 
The emergence of ad hoc funds for relief from disasters is a testament to 
the collective conviction that shifting the loss from the direct victims is a way 
to mitigate the overall devastating impact of a disaster. For one, the loss is thus 
borne by a broader pool of payers, unable to drain the high marginal utility 
regions of people’s welfare functions. Moreover, with the geographical 
concentration of victims, disasters have a “super-additive” impact, destroying 
not only the sum of the individual properties or lives, but entire communities. 
Thus, unlike more routine loss events (such as those that fall below the disaster 
declaration threshold), relief for truly catastrophic disasters is not regarded as a 
bailout of the irresponsibly uninsured.215  
If disaster relief is an irresistible instinct of a decent society, it is a social 
insurance scheme that people—especially if uninsured through ordinary 
means—can rely on. It does not matter that many of the victims could have 
purchased insurance (does the Coast Guard refrain from rescuing a drowning 
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vessel that failed to equip itself with adequate life boats?). This social insurance 
can be eliminated if people buy insurance policies. Hence, the government’s 
subsidy of such policies can be understood as an attempt to shift from funding 
completely free ex post relief to funding a cost-sharing scheme.  
We can end this Article with a call for ending government-run weather 
insurance, replacing it with more selective policies of need-based subsidies.216 
This would eliminate the inefficient incentives to develop and redevelop 
coastal land, as well as the regressive redistribution. But where is the sense in 
such a naïve proposal? Congress did enact a law to eliminate the flood 
insurance subsidies—a bipartisan law remarkably passed in the peak days of 
political gridlock—only to quickly toss it out in an even more widely 
supported bill. Insurance affordability, it turns out, is one of the most effective 
political calls to arms, resulting here in a premium scheme that will likely 
remain in place for decades. We can only contribute to clarifying its enormous 
social cost. 
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